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We introduce a tri-level defender-attacker-defender optimization model that 
prescribes how Iraq’s oil infrastructure can, over time, be expanded, protected, and 
operated, even in the face of insurgent attacks.  The outer-most defender model is a 
mixed-integer program that, given a set of anticipated insurgent attacks, specifies a 
quarterly capital expansion, defense, and operation plan to maximize oil exports over a 
decade-long planning horizon.  The intermediate attacker model, observing the outer 
defender plans, is a mixed integer program that re-optimizes insurgent attacks to 
minimize export flow.  The inner-most defender model is a linear program that re-directs 
flow in response to insurgent damage.  We use open-source descriptions of current Iraqi 
oil infrastructure and reasonable estimates of the costs to expand capacity and/or defend 
operating assets, and reduce vulnerability to attacks.  We solve this tri-level model by 
converting it into an equivalent bi-level one, and applying decomposition.  For a range of 
scenarios, we determine the best allocation of effort between improving oil export 
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Iraq has oil and natural gas that are by volume second only to its neighbor Saudi 
Arabia.  Still, despite decades of production, only a small portion of Iraq’s true oil-
producing potential has ever been tapped and remained functioning.  The leaders in Iraq 
know this and recognize that their country’s future growth and prosperity hinge on 
developing and protecting their oil industry because roughly 95% of their foreign 
exchange earnings are generated from oil.  The insurgents know this as well and are 
equally determined to undermine the government and bring about economic collapse by 
hobbling the nation’s most profitable industry.  
Since the beginning of Operation Iraqi Freedom, Iraq has sustained a reported 7 to 
12 billion dollars in damages to its oil infrastructure and loss of revenues as a result of 
257 attacks.  These types of attacks are particularly troublesome because without efficient 
and reliable oil production – Iraq’s principal resource – the newly-established 
government cannot generate the funds needed to repair damaged infrastructure.  It also 
cannot attract outside capital to fund long-term improvements to the pipeline network or 
modernize its refineries to support domestic fuel requirements. 
To provide a better understanding of the resiliency of the current Iraqi oil network 
and to explore options for improving it, this thesis seeks a multi-year capacity expansion 
and investment plan for Iraq’s crude oil delivery system that allocates funds between 
increasing capacity and defense of completed infrastructure.  Our goal is to maximize the 
daily volume of crude oil exported from Iraq for sale. 
We accomplish this objective by introducing a tri-level defender-attacker-
defender optimization model that prescribes how Iraq’s oil infrastructure can, over time, 
be expanded, protected, and operated, even in the face of insurgent attacks.  The outer-
most defender model is a mixed-integer program that, given a set of anticipated insurgent 
attacks, specifies a quarterly capital expansion, defense, and operation plan to maximize 
oil exports over a decade-long planning horizon.  The intermediate attacker model, 
observing the outer defender plans, is a mixed integer program that re-optimizes 
insurgent attacks to minimize export flow.  The inner-most defender model is a linear 
 xviii
program that re-directs flow in response to insurgent damage.  We use open-source 
descriptions of current Iraqi oil infrastructure and reasonable estimates of the costs to 
expand capacity and/or defend operating assets, and reduce vulnerability to attacks.  We 
solve this tri-level model by converting it into an equivalent bi-level one, and applying 
decomposition.  For a range of scenarios, we determine the best allocation of effort 
between improving oil export infrastructure, and defending it. 
One distinguishing feature of the tri-level defender-attacker-defender model is 
that we formally represent our construction projects as being so large and costly that we 
cannot expect to hide our plans.  We anticipate that insurgents will have full prior 
knowledge of our construction and defense strategy, and will carry out optimal attacks to 
the best of their ability on our vulnerable infrastructure to minimize our capacity to pump 
crude oil out of Iraq. 
The results of our tri-level model indicate that significant improvements in export 
capacity are possible despite an ongoing insurgent campaign to hinder the flow of oil.  
Five different scenarios are considered.  The first is a baseline scenario in which 
moderate attacks are allowed.  The next two are escalations on the baseline scenario in 
which insurgents are allowed more attacks over the forty-quarter planning horizon, as 
well as multiple waves of attacks against the same targets (i.e. the defender doesn’t learn 
from previous attacks and defend better).  The final two scenarios explore the effect on 
oil exports if the construction and defense costs are actually 50% higher than baseline. 
All five scenarios indicate that defensive measures are very important to limit the 
effects of the insurgent attacks.  While each scenario is able to achieve over 6 million 
barrels per day in export capacity over the next 10 years, the scenario in which defense 
costs are the highest results in the most drastic decrease in total flow.  However, defenses 
alone have their limitations.  Unconstrained attacks against a finite infrastructure 
inevitably lead to decreases in exports.  Defending critical infrastructure, therefore, 




I. INTRODUCTION  
Formula for success: Rise early, work hard, strike oil. 
 
Jean Paul Getty (1892-1976), 
American Industrialist and Founder of the Getty Oil Company 
 
 
A. MOTIVATION  
Iraq has oil and natural gas that are by volume second only to its neighbor Saudi 
Arabia.  Still, despite decades of production, only a small portion of Iraq’s true oil-
producing potential has ever been tapped and remained functioning.  The leaders in Iraq 
know this and recognize that their country’s future growth and prosperity hinge on 
developing and protecting the industry responsible for roughly 95% of its foreign 
exchange earnings.  Insurgents know this as well and are equally determined to 
undermine the government and bring about economic collapse by hobbling the nation’s 
most profitable industry.  
Despite this clear dependence between oil exports and the economy, Iraq’s 
enormous debt and the multitude of other high priority social needs have prevented any 
real significant investment in any one area.  As a result, Iraq’s infrastructure has 
languished for over a decade, its pipelines suffer daily attacks and looting, and its oil 
fields continue to post steady declines in production.  In truth, Iraq has neglected its 
lifeblood industry for far too long and requires a capital expansion and security plan - as 
well as the financial commitments to execute it.  This thesis is a first attempt at that plan 
and utilizes a three-level approach to determining the best combination of new 
construction, upgrades and defense of the Iraqi crude oil distribution network.  All flow 
capacities, configurations, and costs are estimated representations of the current and 
future Iraqi crude oil distribution system.  We focus on the distribution of crude oil for 
export, rather than its downstream processing and refining systems.  We also rely on the 
assumption that technical issues involving oil extraction (i.e. water cut, damage from oil 
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re-injection, etc.) are resolved and that sufficient flows are attainable at the oil fields to 
meet published pipeline capacities. 
 
B. BACKGROUND 
World demand for oil currently stands at approximately 79.5 million barrels per 
day (mbbd) [McKillop, 2004] and continues to grow.  The Persian Gulf countries, 
collectively, supply upwards of 27 percent of this demand (including 22 percent of U.S. 
imports) and possess approximately two thirds of the world’s proven reserves. 
This region plays a key role in sustaining a healthy world energy balance, above 
and beyond the obvious realities of supply and demand.  The stable flow of oil to the 
largest industrial countries of the world is critical to their economies and industry.  
Preserving a “surplus” production capacity within the major oil producing regions is 
therefore in the interest of all nations and serves as a buffer against unexpected economic 
downturns and regional conflicts.  At present, the only Persian Gulf nation with 
sustainable excess capacity is Saudi Arabia with approximately 1.0 to 1.5 mbbd and an 
estimated 1.2 trillion barrels in proven oil reserves [Kennedy, 2004].  Iraq, by 
comparison, has the world’s third largest proven reserves (and will likely move up the list 
of oil-rich nations to become the second largest once additional exploration is 
completed).  Despite its sizeable reserves, Iraq has not sustained rates above 3 mbbd for 
any significant period of time since the 1979 Iran-Iraq War.  In addition, the majority of 
Iraq’s 4,300-mile pipeline system has suffered from poor maintenance and the effects of a 
ten-year embargo, looting and war. 
Despite sizeable commitments of troops and resources, the overall condition of 
the Iraqi oil network has not significantly improved since the overthrow of Saddam 
Hussein.  Frequent attacks against Iraq’s key infrastructure continue to cost the Iraqi 
government and the United States millions of dollars each week.  Since the beginning of 
Operation Iraqi Freedom, Iraq has sustained over $7 billion in damages [Barazanji, 2004, 
et. al.  Some sources estimate the damages as high as $12 billion U.S. dollars] to its oil 
infrastructure as a result of 257 attacks (the most recent occurring August 4, 2005, 
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following a series of three explosions resulting in damage to the pipeline between Kirkuk 
and Bayji) [IAGS, 2005].  These types of attacks are particularly troublesome because 
without efficient and reliable oil production – Iraq’s principal resource – the newly-
established government cannot generate the funds needed to repair damaged 
infrastructure. It also cannot attract outside capital to fund long-term improvements to the 
pipeline network or modernize its refineries to support domestic fuel requirements.  
Unfortunately, all of these difficulties are occurring at the same time that world oil 
markets are near an all-time high price per barrel of crude.   For this reason, we examine 
the network that transports Iraq’s most valuable resource and assess those segments of 
the pipeline in most need of repair, protection, or additional upgrades and redundancies. 
 
1. Problem Statement and Relevance to Stability and Support 
Operations 
We investigate the advantages and difficulties of developing an optimal 
interdiction and capital expansion model of the Iraqi crude oil distribution network.  The 
concept of protecting this infrastructure is not new, nor is the threat.  In present-day Iraq 
U.S. forces and Iraqi nationals are engaged daily in an ongoing struggle against an enemy 
whose tactics are comparable to those of other guerrilla forces around the world.  While it 
is not widely discussed by the mainstream media, attacks on oil infrastructure are a 
regular occurrence around the world, and the United States has involved itself when 
necessary to aid in protecting it.  In regions such as Georgia, Azerbaijan, and other parts 
of Eastern Europe, the United States has provided substantial military assistance for 
training and equipping military forces assigned to protect oil infrastructure [Klare, 2004].  
The same is true in countries closer to home such as embattled Columbia.  Since 2002, 
U.S. forces have assumed increasing responsibility for protection of that country’s 
vulnerable oil pipelines and hundreds of millions of dollars have been appropriated to 
enhance oil infrastructure security, beginning with the Cano-Limon pipeline [Klare, 
2004, Dauenhauer, 2003, et al.].  Even in the United States, the Alaska pipeline has been 
the target of at least fifty random attacks and at least one failed terrorist threat [Clark, 
2001].  So the importance of improving infrastructure defense - in general - has been a 
topic of importance for some time and has enjoyed renewed interest since September 
11th. 
 
2. Existing Iraqi Oil Distribution Network and Candidate Expansion 
Opportunities 
Iraq’s network of pipelines for transporting crude oil spans somewhere between 
3,300 and 4,300 miles [Greste, 2004 and Luft, 2004] depending on whether you include 
abandoned pipelines.  In addition, there are another 830 miles used for transporting 
refined fuels and 1,081 miles of natural gas pipelines.  We focus exclusively on the crude 
oil distribution system.  Figure 1 illustrates all of the major crude oil pipelines, as well as 
several potential pipeline expansion projects. 
 




 At present the country’s oil sector is divided into two basic regions with Iraq’s 
Northern Oil Company (NOC) overseeing northern and central Iraq, and Iraq’s Southern 
Oil Company (SOC) overseeing southern Iraq and the two large off-shore loading 
facilities at Basra (formerly Mina al-Bakr) and Khor al-Amaya in the Persian Gulf.  
Because of the steady frequency of attacks against the northern oil route (oil flowing 
from Kirkuk and East Baghdad to Turkey’s Ceyhan port in the Meditarranean) exports to 
Turkey have been sporadic since 2003.  The majority of Iraq’s oil production is presently 
extracted from the giant southern Rumeila and Zubair oil fields and reservoir.  Like 
everywhere else in Iraq these areas are experiencing steady declines in production.  As 
recently as May of this year Iraq was exporting between 1.4 and 1.5 mbbd from the Basra 
and Khor al-Amaya terminals [Alexander, 2005c].  Based on their published capacities 
Basra has a maximum capability to load nearly 2.0 mbbd and Khor al-Amaya 
approximately 1.6 mbbd. 
 Export routes to several of Iraq’s neighbors did at one time exist.  Syria and Iraq 
were connected by a 650 kbbd pipeline from Iraq’s northern Kirkuk oil fields to Syria’s 
Mediterranean port of Banias up until 1982.  It was at that time that Syria blocked flows 
on the pipeline as a show of support for Iran during the Iran-Iraq War.  In July 1998 – 
post Desert Storm – Iraq and Syria entered into negotiations to reopen the line but did not 
secure U.N. approval for such a measure.  Oil is believed to have moved unofficially via 
this channel on a number of occasions following these negotiations in direct violation of 
the UN’s Oil for Food program.  Then in March 1993 the pipeline was officially closed 
again by coalition forces seeking to stem the flow of illegal oil leaving the country.  In 
March 2004, this same pipeline was again reported available for more modest flows of 
approximately 250 kbbd [Feld, 2005b]. 
 In September 1987, construction of a $1.5 billion spur line from Zubair in 
southern Iraq to Saudi Arabia was completed.  This 1.65 mbbd high-capacity line was 
originally constructed as an alternate export channel for Iraqi oil during the Iran-Iraq war.  
When completed it allowed oil to move from southern Iraq across Saudi Arabia to the 
Red Sea port of Mu’ajiz, just north of Yanbu.  This pipeline, however, only operated for 
two years before it was closed by Saudi Arabia following Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in 
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August 1990.  Since that time Saudi Arabia has expropriated those sections of the 
pipeline within its borders and converted it to a natural gas pipeline.  The Iraqi sections of 
the pipeline in turn have been looted extensively and are described as not being in a 
usable form because of its long-term closure [Aljazeera, 2003]. 
 Construction of a pipeline connecting Iraq’s northern oil fields and Jordan’s al-
Zarqa refinery has been a topic of discussion for over two decades.  In 1985 plans were 
underway to build a 1.5 mbbd pipeline following the right-of-way lines established by the 
old Iraq Petroleum Company (IPC) from Kirkuk to a point north of Amman, then 
proceeding south to al-Agabah [Gates, 1985].  This project was never initiated for lack of 
funding and the ongoing Iran-Iraq war.  Then in 2001, numerous reports again appeared 
indicating that the Jordanian government was close to completing a $350 million (U.S.) 
agreement to replace its nearly 90 kbbd oil tanker-truck fleet with a new pipeline capable 
of transporting as much as 350 kbbd [Dalal, 2004, et. al.].  At present, this project resides 
only on paper within Iraq’s borders though some work is believed to have been 
accomplished in Jordan. 
 Iraq and Kuwait share a 124-mile border.  In July 1990, Iraq accused Kuwait of 
“attempting to weaken Iraq”, encroaching on Iraqi territory, draining oil from the 
Rumaila field which straddles the border between these two countries, and colluding with 
the United Arab Emirates to “flood the oil market…and collapse oil prices.” [Feld, 
2005b].  Shortly afterwards, Iraq moved as many as 30,000 troops to the Iraqi-Kuwaiti 
border and set in motion a chain of events leading up to the first Gulf War.  Kuwait and 
Iraq have maintained cool relations ever since.  However, recent diplomatic exchanges 
between the two countries following the ousting of Saddam Hussein have suggested that 
limited “swap” arrangements and export opportunities may exist between them in the 
future. 
 Similar arrangements are virtually certain to be approved between Iran and Iraq.  
The most likely of these proposals is an oil exchange agreement of approximately 250 
kbbd (and potentially more) in which Iraq will pump crude oil to Iran’s Abadan refinery 
on Kharg Island and would receive in return an equal amount of refined products that are 
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desperately needed to meet critical shortages in gasoline, kerosene and diesel fuel [Mehr, 
2005, et. al.].  
 Iraq’s largest pipeline is the 600-mile dual-channel Kirkuk-Ceyhan (Turkey) 
pipeline.  It has a published capacity of 1.6 mbbd but reportedly could only handle 
around 900 kbbd before Operation Iraqi Freedom [Feld, 2005a].  Prior to the war over 
40% of Iraq’s oil exports were transported via this route [Giragosian, 2004], however, 
since liberation this stretch of pipeline has been the target of repeated attacks and is only 
operational sporadically, thereby necessitating the almost exclusive use of the southern 
export channels.  We assume that extensive repairs are required to achieve any sustained 
capacity above fifty percent. 
 Lastly, there is the renovation of Iraq’s 1.4 mbbd “Strategic North-South Oil 
Pipeline.”  Completed in 1975, this pipeline was originally constructed to optimize export 
capabilities by facilitating both north and south movement of oil to match export capacity 
with demand.  The pipeline consists of two parallel 700 kbbd lines.  During the first gulf 
War this pipeline was disabled after the K-3 pump station at Haditha, as well as four 
other pump stations were destroyed.  Today, the exact status of this pipeline is not 
precisely known.  We optimistically assign it a capacity of 700 kbbd from Pump Station 
K-3 (Haditha) to Zubair.  We also consider a second – previously unconstructed – north-
south pipeline connecting Kirkuk with East Baghdad then continuing south to Zubair.  
The length of this pipeline would be about 470 miles, and we assume the engineering 
details are comparable to other previous new construction projects.  Offering an option 
for such an ambitious addition to the Iraqi network explores the effects and 
improvements that might be achievable through expanded capacity and redundancy in the 
oil distribution network. 
 
Figure 2. Map of Iraq’s Major Road and Oil Export Network [IAGS, 2005] 
 
3. Insights to be Gained from this Research 
We seek insights for the following questions:  
(1) What are the optimal interdiction points on the current and future Iraqi oil 
distribution network that an insurgent might target if he wishes to minimize the amount 
of export flow from the network? 
(2) Given a finite amount of dollars to expand and defend oil infrastructure, what 
additional pipeline sections produce the greatest improvement in flow capacity and 
contribute to a more robust network over the next ten years? 
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We represent Iraq’s oil infrastructure based on open-source documentation and 
unclassified government reports of Iraq’s crude oil pipelines.  Our first goal is to assess 
the criticality of specific pipelines and transfer points in the current configuration that 
when lost are likely to drive overall crude oil distribution below 3 mbbd.  The coalition 
and Iraqi government have announced a goal for a sustained crude oil production rate 
between 2.8 and 3.0 mbbd, an achievable benchmark based on the maximum average 
flow sustained by Iraq prior to its war with Iran in 1979. 
Attaining an objective flow rate is important but not sustainable if we cannot also 
build a robust distribution network.  Our second goal is to study the effectiveness of 
specific infrastructure expansion and defense measures attainable by allocating a fixed 
budget over a multi-year planning horizon.  Numerous post-war Iraq surveys estimate the 
capital required to rehabilitate the oil industry ranges from 2 to 45 billion dollars over the 
next 10 years.  Much of Iraq’s capital expansion traditionally comes from private 
industry; however, the ongoing looting and destruction of the infrastructure, intimidation 
and violence against technical personnel, as well as uncertain political and legal 
considerations that can only be resolved by an elected government, are likely to deter 
private investment in the short term.  For this reason, a sizeable initial investment is 
likely required to implement any portion of this proposal until security can be restored.  
In 2003, the U.S. Congress approved $18.4 billion in aid for Iraq.  Only a portion of this 
amount was ever earmarked for the oil industry, and to date very little of that has been 
spent on improving actual infrastructure [Feld, 2005a].  Theoretically, if remaining funds 
are used or new sources appropriated, a reasonable starting figure supported by a number 
of sources for achieving pre-war oil production levels is about $6 billion.  This is why 
answering the second question is so important.  Because the price tag for improving and 
repairing the infrastructure is relatively large, it is critical to determine which projects 
most improve the overall flow rate and survivability of the distribution system.  More 
importantly, can we quantify what the return on investment is in terms of additional oil 
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II. MODEL DEVELOPMENT 
If you build it they will come – and then they’ll try to blow it up 
 
LtCol Lee Morrison,  
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers 
 
A. OVERVIEW 
We seek a multi-year capacity expansion investment plan for Iraq’s crude oil 
delivery system that allocates funds between capacity expansion activities and defense of 
completed infrastructure.  Our goal is to maximize the quarterly volume of crude oil 
delivered out of Iraq for sale. 
These construction projects are so large and costly that we cannot expect to hide 
our plans.  We anticipate that insurgents will have full prior knowledge of our 
construction and defense plans, and will carry out their attacks to the best of their ability 
on our vulnerable infrastructure to minimize our capacity to pump crude oil out of Iraq. 
As a preliminary, expository step, we present a maximum-flow model of an 
existing oil delivery system, and show how to optimize insurgent attacks to minimize this 
maximum flow.  There is no defense here, and the vulnerability of existing infrastructure 
is an exogenous constant, known to both adversaries. 
We then generalize to a multi-period (e.g., quarterly, for ten years) capacity 
expansion investment model, and embellish this with defensive options that decrease 
vulnerability and/or recovery time from insurgent attacks.  The defensive options 
consume funds that would otherwise be devoted to construction.  We still want to 
maximize deliveries out of Iraq, and the insurgents want to minimize these. 
B. DEVELOPING THE CAPITAL EXPANSION AND INTERDICTION 
MODEL 
 
1. Optimizing Maximum Flow through a Capacitated Network, Subject 
to Interdictions: A Bi-level Attacker-Defender Model with Defender 
Represented by a Linear Program 
We want to move crude oil through a capacitated flow network consisting of a 
directed graph G=(N,A), where N is a set of nodes, and A is a set of directed arcs 
connecting node pairs, and each arc has a maximum flow capacity.  Our opponent’s 
objective is to minimize our maximum flow through this network from some 
distinguished source node s to some other distinguished terminal node t. 
We employ an activity-on-arc model: the analogy between a length of oil pipe and 
an arc is obvious.  We must also represent oil-handling facilities such as tank farms and 
pumping stations, and these are also represented as arcs.  For instance, a pumping 
facility is represented by an entry and exit node connected by a capacitated arc 
representing the volume of crude pumped per day. 
The attacker has the capability to destroy a limited number of arcs, reducing each 
destroyed arc capacity to zero for some number of days, and must decide which arcs in 
the network to destroy so that our maximum flow is minimized – perhaps to zero – until 
the damage can be repaired. 
A basic maximum flow model with arc interdictions follows. 
Index Use 
n N∈   node (alias i, j) 
s, t  source, terminal nodes 
( , )i j A∈  arc directed from node i to node j 
( , ) \ ( , )i j R A t s∈ ≡  arcs, excluding back-arc (t,s) directed from node i to node j  
 
Data [units] 
,i ju   upper bound on flow from node i to node j [flow] 
,i jv   penalty cost [fraction of flow interdicted] 
attacks  maximum number of arcs the attacker can destroy [cardinality] 
 
 12
Decision Variables [units] 
,i jFLOW  operator flow on directed arc ( , )i j A∈  [flow] 
,i jATTACK  1 if attacker attacks arc ( , )i j R∈ , 0 otherwise [binary] 
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Node s is connected by invulnerable arcs (that do not represent physical entities 
and are merely a modeling device) to each source node in Iraq, and invulnerable arcs 
connect each exit node from Iraq to node t.  The back-flow on arc (t,s) in the objective 
function represents the amount of oil pumped out of Iraq to market.  The second term in 
the objective penalizes planned flows by the diminished capacities of attacked arcs. 
For complete interdiction of flow on arc (i,j), the (finite) penalty cost vi,j can be 
chosen to be any number greater than 1.  If vi,j = 1, then we are completely indifferent 
about sending flow over the interdicted arc, and the resulting problem may therefore have 
many equivalent optimal solutions.  For any value vi,j > 1, we will be penalized for that 
flow, and therefore will not send any flow across the interdicted arc. 
We envision a model with quarterly time resolution.  Over the span of a quarter, 
damage from any attack can be repaired, though some arcs (e.g., pipelines) are easier to 
repair than others (e.g., pump stations).  For such an attacked arc (i,j), vi,j < 1 represents 
the fraction of planned flow lost during a repair epoch. 
If we wish to make an arc invulnerable to attack, we just set vi,j = 0.  Then 
interdiction of that arc has no effect on the flow across the arc, and would be wasted 
effort. 
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Observing that the inner, maximization problem is a linear program, if we hold 
ATTACK constant momentarily, we can solve this linear program by minimizing the 
duals.  The result is the following mixed-integer program: 
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Using a feasible binary attack plan  from this mixed integer linear 
program (LP), we can recover our residual flows  by solving our seminal 
maximizing linear program for this fixed .  (The values of the dual variables 
might not allow a direct calculation of the optimal flow; they can, in fact, be non-integer, 
even though we would expect them to label the nodes and arcs of the minimum 




The mixed integer linear program can be embellished by any LP restrictions on 
the ATTACK variables. 
 
2. A Bi-Level Defender-Attacker Model, with Defender Choosing 
Capacity Expansion and Defense options, and Maximizing Flows, and 
Attacker Interdicting the Results: Each Opponent is Represented by 
an Integer Linear Program. 
We now want to generalize to a multi-period flow capacity expansion model, 
where our construction budget is limited, and our defensive options consume funds that 
would otherwise be devoted to construction.  We still want to maximize deliveries out of 
Iraq, and the insurgents want to minimize these.  Unlike the simple illustrative example 
above, the capacity expansion model needs to feature binary decisions, and is an integer 
linear program, and the attacker model features general integer decisions.  Accordingly, 
we cannot employ duality to render a conventional model to solve.  Instead, we develop a 
new, two-sided decomposition. 
We restate our notation to accommodate a planning horizon. 
Model FLOW 
 
Index Use [~ cardinality] 
q Q∈   planning quarter (alias q’) [~40] 
d D∈   duration in quarters (alias d’) [<<40] 
n N∈   node (alias i, j) [~100] 
s, t  source, terminal nodes 
( , )i j A∈  directed arcs [~200] 
( , ) \ ( , )i j R A t s∈ ≡   arcs, excluding back-arc (t,s) directed from node i to node j 
( , )i j P R∈ ⊆  arc candidate for capacity expansion project [~200] 
{ , , , }i j q d  4-tuple identifying an admissible project on arc ( ,  )i j P∈
  [~4,000?] 
c C∈   iteration (or “cut”) counter [~100?] 
 
Data [units] 
,i ju   legacy upper bound on flow from node i to node j [flow] 
,i jx   expanded capacity from node i to node j [flow] 
, . , '_ i j d dbuild cost if capacity expansion of arc ( , )i j P∈ has scheduled duration 
d quarters, this cost is incurred in quarter d’ of the construction 
effort (1 ' ) [cost] d d≤ ≤
,_ i jdefense cost cost of defending arc ( , )i j R∈  [cost/flow] 
BUDGET total capacity expansion budget [cost] 





=∑   [cost] 
,spendpen spendpen  penalty per unit of cumulative under, or over expenditure 
 [flow/cost] 
,i jv   penalty cost ( ,0 i jv 1≤ ≤ ) [if attacked, fraction of flow interdicted] 
,i jd   defense effectiveness ( ,0 i j i jd v ,≤ ≤ ) [fraction of flow defended] 
epoch_q epoch in quarters for limiting attacks [quarters] 
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epoch_attacks maximum attacks allowed in epoch [cardinality] 
atks_by_q maximum attacks by quarter [cardinality] 
mx_atks maximum attacks over planning horizon  [cardinality] 
atks_by_n_by_q  maximum attacks of arcs incident to each node, by quarter 
  [cardinality] 
, ,i j qattacks  maximum attacks of each arc, by quarter [cardinality] 
 
Decision Variables [units] 
, , ,i j q dSTART  =1 if capacity expansion project { ,  is selected,  , , }i j p d
0 otherwise [binary] 
, ,i j qDEFEND  =1 if arc ( , )i j R∈  is defended during planning quarter q,  
  0 otherwise [binary] 
, ,i j qFLOW  flow on directed arc ( , )i j A∈  during planning quarter q [flow] 
, ,i j qSAVE  lost flow prevented by defense of arc ( , )i j R∈  [flow] 
, qqSPEND SPEND   under-, over-expenditure of cumulative quarterly budget 
goals through planning quarter q [cost] 
, ,i j qATTACKS  number of attacks on arc ( , )i j R∈  during planning quarter q.,  
[integer] 
 
These decision variables appear in lowercase when their values are temporarily 
fixed, and UPPERCASE otherwise. 
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The objective (F0) expresses how much oil is exported out of Iraq over the 
planning horizon.  Each attack on an arc reduces flow by an amount that reflects the time 
necessary to repair damage, while an attack on a defended arc will inflict less damage, or 
perhaps no damage at all, depending on the effectiveness of the defense effort.  There are 
also penalties for under- or over-spending the cumulative budget through the end of each 
quarter in the planning horizon.  Each of these objective terms is in units of exported oil. 
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For instance, an over-spending violation (e.g., in dollars over-spent) is converted by 
penalty (e.g., in oil per dollars over-spent) and converted into exported oil units. 
Each constraint (F1) enforces conservation of flow into and out of each node.  
Each constraint (F2) limits the flow on an arc by its legacy capacity, or, for an arc 
candidate selected for capacity expansion, by the sum of its legacy capacity and the 
expanded capacity starting in the quarter after arc expansion is completed.  Each 
constraint (F3) limits the effects of a defense effort on an arc to the amount of oil actually 
lost when the arc is attacked.  Each constraint (F4) limits the effects of a defense effort on 
an arc to zero unless that defense is mounted.  Each constraint (F5) assesses the total 
spending through the end of a planning quarter, and determines whether there is any 
under- or over-spending with respect to the cumulative budget target at the end of that 
quarter.  Each constraint (F6) assures that at most one capacity expansion option is 
adopted for a candidate arc.  Stipulations (F7-F11) are domain limits on decision 
variables. 
A more direct way of expressing the objective is: 




t s q i j i j i j q i j q i j qSTART DEFEND q Q i j R q QFLOW SAVE
SPEND SPEND
qq
q Q q Q
FLOW v d DEFEND attacks FLOW








However, this is not linear in DEFEND and FLOW.  The auxiliary variables 
SAVE, objective (F0), and constraints (F3) and (F4) are equivalent, and linear. 
Given a plan to expand capacity, operate, and defend the Iraqi oil export system 
through the end of the planning horizon, an attacker with perfect knowledge of this plan 
would counter-plan accordingly: 
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Model ATTACK: 
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The attacker’s objective (A0) is to minimize net oil exports over the planning 
horizon, precisely the opposite of the Iraqi operator’s objective (F0).  Each attack inflicts 
damage determined by the vulnerability of the arc attacked (expressed in terms of the 
fraction of planned quarterly oil flow reduced during repairs), mitigated by any defense 
effort in place.  Some arcs may be invulnerable to attack with no defense at all, and 
others may be able to be defended well enough to render them invulnerable. 
The constraints (A1)-(A4) offer some examples of how to moderate attacker 
behavior:  Given that this is an integer-linear program, you are limited only by your 
imagination.  Each constraint (A1) optionally limits the number of quarters between 
attacks on any given arc.  Each constraint (A2) optionally limits the total number of 
attacks by quarter.  Constraint (A3) optionally limits the total number of attacks over the 
planning horizon.  Each constraint (A4) optionally limits the number of attacks on arcs 
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adjacent to each node in a given quarter.  (A6) specifies the integer domain of each attack 
variable.  In practice: 
,
,, ,
1 , if 0
, ( , ) , ;
0 , otherwise
i j
i ji j q
vvattacks i j R q Q
⎧ ⎢ ⎥ >⎪ ⎢ ⎥= ∀⎣ ⎦⎨⎪⎩
∈ ∈  
That is, attack effectiveness is limited to interdict no more than 100% of the oil at 
risk. 
We are going to solve a sequence of (ATTACK) models, and each constraint (A5) 
stipulates that the current planned revision of (ATTACK) differs in at least one detail 
from each legacy attack plan:  at least one arc must be attacked that has never before been 
attacked. 
For binary ATTACKS, a single constraint can be used to force some distinguishing 
difference from each legacy attack plan [Brown, et. al., 1997]: 
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For integer ATTACKS, a set of constraints is required.  Let , , , ,,i j q i j qB B
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For our purposes, the restricted constraints (A5) suffice, although they rule out 
revisions that are admissible in (I5). 
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The bi-level, defender-attacker optimization proceeds as follows. 
 
0) Initialize the current attack plan to have no attacks.  Set iteration c = 0. 
1) Given the current attack plan, solve the defender mixed integer program (FLOW), 
yielding a complete capital expansion, oil export, and defense plan for the 
planning horizon. 
2) This defender plan assumes perfect knowledge of a fixed current attack plan, and 
is thus optimistic.  Under certain conditions, the value of (F0) may provide an 
upper bound on the highest net oil export achievable. 
3) Given the defender plan, the attacker uses the mixed integer program (ATTACK) 
to minimize the observed planned flows with a set of attacks that differs in at least 
one detail from each of the c prior, legacy attack plans. 
4) The revised attack plan provides a candidate plan that may be the lowest net oil 
export achieved.  Increase c = c + 1, and record the revised, current attack plan as 
the c-th legacy plan. 
5) Repeat Steps 1) to 4) until the gap between the highest and lowest net oil export is 
sufficiently small, or until reaching some iteration limit. 
6) Recover the best legacy (FLOW) and (ATTACK) plan discovered. 
 
The first solution of (FLOW) in Step 2) assumes no attacks at all.  As such, this is 
a best-case solution for Iraq, and the net oil export is an upper bound on what is 
achievable with or without insurgent attacks. 
The first solution of (ATTACK) in Step 3) attacks a solution to (FLOW) that 
anticipates no attack at all.  This is a “surprise attack” that gives us a lower bound on the 
net oil export achievable.  Each subsequent solution in Step 3) may provide the highest 
lower bound on net oil export achievable.  The highest such lower bound is the best two-
sided plan, where the defender must lead with a complete plan, and then the attacker can 
observe (or gather intelligence about) this plan and follow by attacking it optimally. 
In subsequent iterations, each Step 2) solution of (FLOW) may give us a better 
upper bound.  For the value of the objective (F0) to be a candidate for upper bound 
improvement, the fixed attack plan must have no taut constraint in (A5).  That is, if the 
fixed attack plan found by minimizing (A0) is intrinsically distinct from each prior attack 
plan, then this optimization of (ATTACK) minimizes the same objective that (FLOW) 
maximizes, and thus the value of (ATTACK) may be a better upper bound. 
The (ATTACK) objective assumes that all flows are fixed.  This is optimistic for 
the attacker.  However, when the subsequent (FLOW) model is solved given this attack, 
the response will optimally circumvent the latest attacks. 
 
3. A Tri-Level Defender-Attacker-Defender Model, with Defender 
Choosing Capacity Expansion and Defense options, Attacker 
Interdicting the Results, and Defender Responding to Interdictions by 
Maximizing Flow Using the Remaining Capacity in the Damaged 
System. 
 
Suppose, more realistically, that the defender determines an optimal capacity 
expansion and defense plan with a set of maximal flows.  If we fix these capacity 
expansion and defense decisions, but allow the operator to maximize residual flows after 
any attack, we have a tri-level defender-attacker-defender model [Brown, et. al., 2005b]: 
( ) ( )
.max min max
XZ Y∈∈ ∈x zz y x cy  
Here, z denotes a vector of binary capacity expansion and defense decisions, as 
well as spending penalty variables, z Z∈  represents the constraints and domain 
restrictions on these decisions, and the inner min-max problem represents an attacker-
defender model with a restricted set of attack strategies X(z).  ( )y Y x∈  represents the 
defender’s residual capability to manipulate flows after the attacks, and cy is the objective 
function expressing net oil flow export.  The defender wants to identify a capital 
expansion and defense plan z* so that when the attacker solves: 
( *) ( )
min max .
X Y∈ ∈x z y x cy  
The flow reduction the attacker can guarantee to inflict is minimized by the 
operator’s responses. 
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 We do not know of any direct means to formally solve tri-level defender-attacker-
defender models.  We propose the following (indirect) decomposition.  Restate (FLOW) 
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(DIVERT_FLOW) is a linear program, and the square brackets to the right of 
each constraint define its dual variables.  This permits us to reformulate the attacker-
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Again, the square brackets at the right of each constraint denote its dual variable.  
 denotes the domain restrictions inherited from model (ATTACK), namely 
its constraints (A1)-(A6).   
ATTACKS ∈Α
(DIVERT_FLOW) and (ATTACK_DIVERT) are separable by planning quarter if 
 is. ATTACKS ∈Α
To complete our algorithm, we need one more result. 
 
4.  Lemma 
Following Brown, et. al. [2005a], each Step 2) solution of (FLOW) offers a valid 
upper bound only if its fixed attack plan found by minimizing (AD0) is not constrained 
by (A5). 
 24
To illustrate this simplistically, represent defender capacity expansion and defense 
decisions and constraints by y Y∈ , attacker decisions and constraints by variables 
x X∈ , and ignore the flow variables and constraints seen by both defender and attacker.  
We are solving: 
( )
max min
x X yy Y
cy∈∈ . 
The notation  denotes that the outer maximization solution y influences 
the inner constraint set and domain of x.  The following relationships are immediate: 
( )x X y∈
( ) ( ) ( ), fixed, fixed
max min max min max min
x X y x X y x X y xy Y y y Y y Y
cy cy cy∈ ∈ ∈∈ ∈ ∈≤ ≤ . 
The former inequality is valid because the right-hand maximization is a relaxation 
of the left-hand one.  The latter inequality is valid because the left-hand minimization is a 
relaxation of the right-hand one. 
These global lower and upper bounds hold as transitive inequalities for any 
admissible solutions to this problem, as long as the domain restrictions on admissibility 
of the variables remain invariant. 
Our algorithm generates a sequence of solutions, each featuring a new restriction 
in addition to x X∈  (i.e., x is also restricted to be distinct from any prior one by a 
diversity constraint (A5)).  The upper bound at the far right is admissible if the central 
minimization is a relaxation of the one on the far right and if the domain  
remains invariant.  If no constraint (A5) is taut for such an x, this is the case.  QED. 
( )x X y∈
The tri-level, defender-attacker-defender optimization proceeds as follows. 
 
1) Initialize the current attack plan to have no attacks.  Set iteration c=0. 
2) Given the current attack plan, solve the defender mixed integer program (FLOW), 




3) This defender plan assumes perfect knowledge of a fixed current attack plan, and 
is thus optimistic.  Under the lemma conditions, the value of (F0) provides an 
upper bound on the highest net oil export achievable. 
4) Given the defender plan, solve the bi-level integer linear program 
(ATTACK_DIVERT) for a set of attacks that differs in at least one detail from 
each of the c prior, legacy attack plans, and for a set of dual variables representing 
the simultaneous, responding flow re-planning. 
5) With the capital expansion and defense plan from step 2) fixed, and attacks from 
step 4) fixed, solve the linear program (FLOW) to recover arc flows. 
6) This revision provides a candidate plan that may be the lowest net oil export 
achieved.  Increase c = c + 1, and record the revised, current attack plan as the c-
th legacy plan. 
7) Repeat Steps 1) to 6) until the gap between the highest and lowest net oil export is 
sufficiently small, or until reaching some iteration limit. 
8) Recover the best legacy capital expansion, defense, attack, and flow plan 
discovered. 
 
This is a strategic capacity planning model – an engineering model – not a model 
of two-sided military conflict.  We assume that the attacker can sustain interdictions at 
the rates specified quarter-after-quarter, over the entire planning horizon.  We can 
introduce counter-attacks that attrite the attacker’s capabilities.  To make this operational 
embellishment, which is not difficult, we recommend solving this capacity expansion, 
defense, and counter-attack model quarterly, with quarter-to-quarter revisions of the state 
of attacker and defender.  Brown and Washburn [2000] present a detailed example of 
how to manage such an iteration for a full-scale theater war. 
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III. ESTIMATING COSTS 
Too many people in and outside of Iraq are hoping to deny Iraq a 
better future through a campaign of sabotage and plunder of the country's 
neglected oil facilities… The joint success of Americans and Iraqis to 
rebuild Iraq depends on the ability to bring the country's crude back 
online. 
 
Gal Luft,  
Director of the Institute for the Analysis of Global Security 
 
A. OVERVIEW 
We estimate all of the construction costs, construction durations, penalties and 
defense effectiveness factors reported here.  There is not an open literature source 
detailing the type of data required to build a highly accurate project cost and duration 
estimation model.  There are, however, proprietary sources that typically cost $600 to 
$3000 each and include technical site surveys and field reports.  In addition, there are 
several engineering and consulting firms who specialize in these subjects and claim 
expertise and first-hand knowledge of Iraq’s oil sector and the region’s oil construction 
industry.   
Instead of proprietary sources, we rely upon the U.S. Army Corps of Engineer’s 
historical data and cost estimating factors for similar projects as the starting point for our 
estimation.  We believe that we have developed reasonable, rough order-of-magnitude 
estimates of the real cost; and that if the real and expected costs differ by some common 
factor, this will not impact the overall qualitative outcome of our planning. 
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B. ESTIMATING PIPELINE CONSTRUCTION COST 
 
1. Characterizing the Iraqi Crude Oil Distribution Network by Flow 
Capacity, Node Location and Arc Distances 
Using Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) reports, 
various maps from the National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA) and other public 
sources, as well as news reports concerning Iraq’s oil industry, we nominate a compact 
list of sixty-three primary nodes (see Appendix A)  The flow capacities into and out of 
each of these nodes is based, in most cases, on nameplate information, rather than on a 
mathematical function of pipe diameter, pump station size, or any other combination of 
factors.  Because of varying oil viscosities, pumping station configurations and use of 
various drag reducing agents that are added to aid in-transit oil flows, the mathematical 
functions needed to describe flow capacity are overly complicated.  We accept published 
values.   
In those instances where a new pipeline might be constructed, the diameter and 
flow capacity is assumed to be equal to its previous historical value (if it was an 
abandoned or previously surveyed line), or estimated to be equivalent to another 
comparably-sized segment in the network.  For example, we estimate the second north-
south pipeline to be of the same diameter and flow rate as the existing north-south line 
extending from the K-3 pump station at Haditha to Zubair. 
The pipeline nodes are not located with exact geographical precision, though the 
four-decimal place latitude and longitude coordinates provided in Appendix A might 
suggest otherwise.  We use a map to view the areas of greatest interest and to identify the 
major oil producing regions and infrastructure.  Then, where a city or significant 
geographic feature can be specified by name, we use internet-based tools to determine a 
reasonably precise location (e.g., www.heavens-above.com [Peat, 2005]).  Finally, we 
verify our coordinates using imaging tools that are capable of importing scaled digital 
maps and reporting the approximate geographic location of a map feature.  The tool we 
used is a simulation package called DIAMOND [DMSO, 2005], but there are several 
others with similar features.   
We calculate the lengths of each pipeline segment in nautical miles using the 
great circle formula and the spherical earth model in which one nautical mile subtends 
one minute of an arc created by the earth’s surface (1' 1 1 60nm th degree= = ).  These 
distances are shown in Appendix B.  The calculation is as follows: 
( ) ( )( )
( )( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )( )
1
1 1 2 2 1 2 1 2 1 2
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Compute the distance between the Rumaila oil field (Latitude~30.5333N, 
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2. Estimating New Construction Costs and Their Relationship to the 
Cost of Improving an Existing Pipeline 
We base new pipeline costs on regression results derived from the data contained 
in the U.S. Army Corps of Engineer’s Pax Newsletters 3.2.1 and 3.2.2 [Ghosh, 2005b and 
2005a respectively].  Each of these newsletters is an update to the cost estimation 
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procedures outlined in the Army’s Programming Cost Estimates for Military 
Construction technical manual [U.S. Army, 1994]. 
In Pax Newsletter 3.2.2 [Ghosh, 2005a], the Army Corps of Engineers (ACE) 
categorizes a wide spectrum of potential military construction projects by cost per unit 
quantity based on the Army’s historical construction award data.  In particular, Chart A to 
Appendix A of the newsletter discusses sitework and utility construction using welded 
steel piping comparable to that used in petroleum pipelines.  For sitework and utilities the 
ACE identifies 9 different cost estimates for procuring and assembling schedule-40 black 
steel pipe with diameters ranging from 1 to 24 inches (see Table 1).  
 
Figure 3. Finished pipelines in Iraq are constructed of schedule-40 black steel and 
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Table 1.   U.S. Army Historical Pipe Cost Data.  These are the Army’s historical costs per 
linear foot ($/LF) to furnish, assemble and install schedule 40 black steel piping.  
Trenching, bedding, backfill and compaction – if required – must be added to 
these costs.  For example, a standard 40 foot length of 24 inch diameter piping, is 
expected to cost 40 x 231.80 = $9,272 to procure, stage and weld into place. 
 
We categorize pipes by diameter as small (18”), medium (32”), or large (>45”).  
The sizes of each arc in the Iraqi oil network are shown in Appendix C.  The larger two 
sizes of pipelines – while typical within the oil industry – fall outside the range of the 
Army’s available historical data for steel pipe construction.  So, we extrapolate. 
We estimate pipeline construction costs using two different regression models 
using the data shown in Table 1.  Each is represented as a single variable function of the 
pipe’s diameter.  Boyle [2002] et. al., describes other cost estimation techniques, but 
requires knowledge of specific physical and geographical factors that are not readily 
obtainable for Iraq. 
Calculation of Simple First-Order Model: 
Table 2 shows the model we use to estimate the costs of pipelines up to 45 inches 
in diameter.  For pipelines larger than 45 inches, we use a second-order polynomial 
model because it produces a much steeper increase in cost per linear foot that reflects the 
difficulty of procuring, staging and assembling large-diameter steel piping. 
 Summary Confidence Ints.
Level 0.95 R2 0.969047
Estimate SE Lower Upper s 13.81914
Slope 9.159065 0.6187 7.69608 10.6221
Constant -8.658352 7.17382 -25.622 8.30502  
Table 2.   Summary of Pipeline Results Using First-Order Regression.  This figure 
summarizes the results of a simple first-order regression used for ‘small’ and 
‘medium’ sized pipes.  The estimate column lists the coefficients for the linear 
model (y = a + bx), where ‘y’ is the estimated cost, ‘a’ is the constant coefficient, 
‘b’ is slope coefficient, and ‘x’ is the diameter of the pipe in inches.  The other 
values are qualitative expressions supporting the linear model and are standard 
statistical terms [e.g., see Montgomery, et. al., 2001, pp. 13-39].  SE is the 
standard error of the coefficients. ‘s’ is the standard error of the residuals.  The 
coefficient of determination (R2) and the upper- lower-bounds on the confidence 




H0: Slope = 0 H0: Const = 0
H1: Slope > 0 H1: Const < 0






Table 3.   Summary of Pipeline Hypothesis Testing Using Simple First-Order 
Regression.  The first test evaluates the assertion that the slope of the true 
regression is zero (H0) versus the alternative that it is greater than zero (H1).  We 
see that the probability of H0 being true is very low (p-value = 7.69E-07) and we 
reject it at a significance level of α=0.05.  The second test evaluates the 
probability that the constant (or intercept) of the line is 0 (H0), or something less 
than 0 (H1).  Based on a p-value = 0.13 we do not reject H0 at the 0.05 
significance level and conclude that forcing the line through the origin is one 
acceptable model.  
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Simple First-Order Model:  ( )Cost $ LF 9.159 Diam (in) 8.658= ⋅ −  
 
 Tables 2 and 3 summarize our simple first-order model and highlight the 
qualitative terms we use to verify the “goodness” of the regression.  The coefficient of 
determination (R2) in Table 2 is very reasonable and indicates that the model describes 
96.9% of the variability in cost with just the diameter of the pipe as a predictor [e.g., 
Montgomery, et al., 2001, pp. 39].  There are also two hypothesis tests shown in Table 3 
respectively for the slope and constant (or intercept) terms.  These are standard statistical 
tests.  The first indicates with a high degree of certainty (~100%) that the true slope is 
greater than zero – i.e. costs increase with diameter.  The second test concerns where a 
regression intercepts the y-axis.  The hypothesis test concludes that it is not an 
unreasonable assumption to force the line through the origin, however, allowing a 
negative value at the extreme lower end of the regression contributes to a steeper overall 
slope in the first-order model.  We believe a steeper slope is desirable to better facilitate a 
switch over to a second-order polynomial equation at large pipe diameters.  The end 
result is this produces closer agreement between the two models at the point of transition. 
 Figure 4 shows a graph of the linear model describing the cost per linear foot of 
pipes up to 60-inches in diameter.  The diamonds indicate the Army’s historical costs for 
pipe of those sizes.  Above and below the solid line (the fitted values) are the 95% 
confidence interval (CI) and prediction intervals (PI) respectively.  (For reference, the 
prediction bands are the furthest from the best-fit line and are drawn slightly outside of 
the confidence bands.)  The 95% prediction interval is the area in which you expect 95% 
of all individual data points to be observed.  In contrast, the 95% confidence interval is 
the region that has a 95% chance of containing the true regression line [e.g., 
Montgomery, et. al., 2001, pp. 32-39]. 
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Pipeline Construction Cost

























Cost ($/LF) = 9.159 Diam (in) - 8.658
 
Figure 4. Fitted Values for First-Order Pipeline Model with 95% CI and PI Bounds 
Indicated.  This represents pipeline costs per linear foot as a function of diameter.  
Per the solid center line, a 32-inch pipeline is expected to cost ~$284 per linear 
foot.  However, the 95% confidence interval for this regression line indicates that 
the pipe’s true cost might realistically fall between $249 and $320 per linear foot.  
If enough observations were available, the 95% prediction bounds indicate that 
single point estimates for the cost of a linear foot of pipe can be observed as low 
$236 and as high as $332 per linear foot. 
 
The overall fit of the data in Figure 4 appears to be reasonable; and at a 45-inch 
diameter the upper and lower bounds on the prediction interval are not more than ±15% 
of the model estimate.  Table 4 provides a sample of five values taken from the above 
graph. 
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Bounds on the Estimate C.I. for Cost ($/LF) P.I. for Cost ($/LF)
Level 0.95 Level 0.95
Diam (in) Cost ($/LF) Lower Upper Lower Upper
0 (8.658)   (25.622) 8.305    (45.476) 28.159    
18 156.205 138.991 173.419 119.271 193.139  
32 284.432 248.909 319.954 236.165 332.698  
45 403.500 349.558 457.441 340.432 466.567  
48 430.977 372.730 489.223 364.190 497.763   
Table 4.   Upper and Lower Bounds on Pipeline Construction Cost Estimates Using 
Simple First-Order Model.  Using a 45-inch diameter pipe as an example, we 
estimate the base cost to be $403.50 per linear foot.  The 95% confidence interval 
predicts that the true regression estimate might really be as high as $457.44 and as 
low as $349.56 per linear foot (±13.4%).  On the other hand if we could look at 
more historical data on 45-inch pipeline construction we would not expect the 
project costs for these new observations to cost more than $466.57 or less than 
$340.43 per linear foot. (±15.6%). 
 
 
Calculation of Second-Order Polynomial Model: 
We use a second-order polynomial equation for pipe sections larger than 45 
inches.  We adopt this to reflect empirical evidence that at larger diameters the pipe’s 
wall thickness, weld times, and structural enhancements all contribute towards a super-
linear increase in pipe cost.  The Army’s historical data does not cover the full range of 
pipe sizes, so there is uncertainty where the best transition between the simple first-order 
model and the second-order polynomial model should occur.  At 30 inches diameter the 
first-order model begins to predict fitted values that are below the 95% prediction bound 
of the second-order model.  We require cost estimates for diameters up to 60 inches, so 
we assign the change-over between equations at the midpoint between 30 and 60 inches.   




Level 0.95 R2 0.988
Estimate SE Lower Upper s 9.22
Constant 7.087 6.957 -9.935 24.109
Diam (in) 4.349 1.597 0.443 8.256
Diam (in)^2 0.201 0.064 0.043 0.359  
Table 5.    Summary of Pipeline Construction Cost Estimates Using Second-Order 
Polynomial Fit.  This figure summarizes the results of the second-order 
polynomial regression used for ‘large’ pipelines ( >45 inches).  The estimate 
column shows the coefficients for the second-order polynomial model (y = a + bx 
+ cx2), where  ‘y’ is the estimated cost of pipe per linear foot, ‘a’ is the constant 
coefficient, ‘b’ is the first-order term for the slope, ‘c’ is the second-order term, 
and ‘x’ is the diameter of the pipe in inches.  The other values are qualitative 
expressions supporting the non-linear model and are comparable to those 
discussed in Table 2 and most statistical texts [Montgomery, et. al., 2001, pp. 
221-228]. 
 
Second Order Polynomial:  ( ) [ ] [ ]2Cost $ LF 7.09 + 4.35 Diam (in)  + 0.2 Diam (in)= ⋅ ⋅  
 
Using the above equation, we estimate the cost for a 48-inch pipeline – similar to 
those connecting Rumaila with Zubair and Zubair with Saudi Arabia – to be 
 dollars per linear foot of pipe.  This is an 
increase of 57% over the cost predicted by the first-order model, but is actually much 
closer to the true cost experienced by oil companies building larger diameter pipelines 
[Boyle, 2002]. 
( ) ( )27.087 4.349 48 0.201 48 679⎡ + + ≅⎣ ⎤⎦
Figure 5 shows the predicted costs of a pipeline using the second-order 
polynomial equation.  Similar to Figure 4, the 95% confidence and prediction bands in 
Table 6 provide representative values for the fitted, confidence bands and prediction 




























2nd Order Polynomial Fit:
Cost ($/LF) = 7.09 + 4.35 Diam (in) + 0.2 Diam (in)^2
 
Figure 5. Second-Order Polynomial Model with 95% CI and PI Bounds Indicated.  
This estimates pipeline costs per linear foot as a function of diameter.  A 48-inch 
pipeline is estimated to cost ~$679 per linear foot  However, the 95% confidence 
interval for this regression line indicates that the pipe’s true cost is between $480 
and $877.  Also, if enough observations were taken, the 95% prediction bounds 
on the point estimates for the cost of one linear foot of pipe would be between 
$478 and $878. 
 
Because of the second-order term in the second-order model, the increase in 
separation between the fitted values and the confidence and prediction bands increases 
more rapidly than in Figure 4.  This is normal for a second-order model [e.g., Devore, 




Bounds on the Estimate C.I. for Cost ($/LF) P.I. for Cost ($/LF)
Level 0.95 Level 0.95
Diam (in) Cost ($/LF) Lower Upper Lower Upper
0 7.087      (9.935)   24.109  (21.174) 35.348  
18 150.462  137.753 163.172 124.569 176.355
32 351.979  293.584 410.374 289.378 414.580
45 609.617  443.672 775.562 442.145 777.089
48 678.715  480.232 877.198 478.954 878.476  
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Table 6.   Upper and Lower Bounds on Pipeline Construction Cost Estimates Using a 
Second-Order Polynomial Fit.  Using a 48-inch diameter pipe as an example, 
we compute the base cost to be $678.72 per linear foot.  The 95% confidence 
interval predicts that the true regression estimate might really be as high as 
$877.20 and as low as $480.23 per linear foot (±29.2%).  On the other hand if we 
could look at more historical data on 48-inch pipeline construction we would not 
expect the project costs for these new observations to cost more than $878.48 or 
less than $478.95 per linear foot. (±29.4%). 
 
Incorporation of Area Cost Factors: 
In Pax Newsletter 3.2.1 [Ghosh, 2005b] the Army Corps of Engineers provides 
Area Cost Factors (ACF) used for adjusting cost estimates based on the relative 
availability of labor, materials and equipment for a specific region of the world. The ACF 
for Iraq is currently set in Table B of the newsletter at 1.71 [Ghosh, 2005b].  This means 
a $100 million project at a location with an ACF of 1.0 is estimated to cost $171 million 
in Iraq. 
 
Relationship between new construction and upgrades to an existing system: 
We estimate the cost of upgrading an existing but degraded oil pipeline to be 50% 
of the cost of a new construction.  For example, we estimate the cost of upgrading the 
existing pipeline arc between the Rumaila oil field and the Zubair oil hub as $144.62 
(CY07$M). 
 
3. Estimating the Number and Costs of Pump and Booster Stations 
Along a Pipeline 
Pumping stations are required to maintain static pressure in the pipelines over 
changes in elevation and distance.  Using the configuration descriptions of several other 
similar oil pipeline projects we find that on average pump and booster stations are built 
approximately every 144.8 km (90 mi).  The equation we used for computing the number 
of pump stations is based exclusively on pipeline length and is as follows: 
[ ] [ ]Arc Length 30 km, then ( Arc Length /144.8412 km),  
otherwise 0)
ROUNDIF ⎧ >= ⎨⎩  
We use data found in the U.S. Army Corps of Engineer’s Pax Newsletters 3.2.2 [Ghosh, 
2005a] to estimate the costs of these new pump and booster stations. 
 
 
Figure 6. Artist’s representation of a typical pump station with ancillary facilities.  
[SPG Media Limited, 2005].  Pump and booster stations similar to this are 
typically groupings of pumps operating in parallel.  They are constructed 
approximately every 90 miles and their cost is a function of the expected flow 
capacity (gallons of oil per minute).  This results in costs ranging from $0.25 to 
$9.8 million dollars per station in Iraq. 
 
We apply a simple linear regression model based on the Army’s historical data 
involving water pumping stations (category code 84472 of Appendix A, Part II) [Ghosh, 









Table 7.   U.S. Army Historical Water Pumping Station Cost Data.  This shows Army 
historical costs for a water pumping station at each indicated flow capacity.  This 
price includes the cost to furnish, assemble and install each unit, and accounts for 
such items as the diesel drive, auto controls, and fittings and accessories.  A 
complete pumping station usually has multiple pumping units mounted in parallel 
to accommodate the full flow volume of the pipeline. 
 
Calculation of Simple Linear Model: 
Table 8 summarizes the results of a simple first-order regression using the data in 
Table 7.  
Summary Confidence Ints.
Level 0.95 R2 0.86          
Estimate SE Lower Upper s 8,267.90  
Constant 72,548.00 8,866.34  34,399.19  110,696.81
gpm 18.58        5.23         (3.92)         41.08          
Table 8.   Pump and Booster Station Costs Using Simple First-Order Regression.  This 
figure summarizes the results of a simple first-order regression.  The estimate 
column lists the coefficients for the first-order model (y = a + bx) used for 
calculating the cost of a water pumping station.  The other values are qualitative 
expressions supporting the first-order model and are similar in description to 
those values discussed in Table 2, and in statistical texts [Montgomery, et. al., 
2001, pp. 13-39].  
 
 
Simple Linear Model:   ( )Cost $ 18.58 Flow (gpm) 72,548.00= ⋅ +
 Table 8 summarizes the basic first-order model and highlights the qualitative 
terms we use to verify the “goodness” of the regression.  The coefficient of determination 
(R2) is not particularly high and indicates that the model only describes 86% of the 
variability in cost when using gallons-per-minute (gpm) as the predictor variable [e.g., 
Montgomery, et al., 2001, p. 39].  The confidence intervals of this regression reveal 
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significant uncertainty (±53% on the constant and ±121% on the slope).  This is because 
of the small number of data points available from which to base the regression. 
Figure 7 and Table 9 show the fitted values of a second-order polynomial 
regression in relation to the computed 95% confidence and prediction intervals.  We see 
that a simple doubling of flow rates from 2,500 to 5,000 gpm increases costs by a much 
as 246% (between the lower extreme and the higher extreme of the two pump capacities) 
based on the uncertainty intrinsic to this model.   
Pump Station Construction Costs
























Cost (CY$07) = 18.578 Capac (gpm) + 72548
 
Figure 7. First-Order Pump Station Cost Model with 95% CI and PI Bounds 
Indicated.  This estimates pump station costs as a function of gallons-per-minute 
of flow capacity.  For example a pump station with a flow rate of 2,500 gpm has a 
base cost of $72,548 (based on the intercept), plus an additional $46,445 
associated with the capacity of the pumps.  The 95% confidence and prediction 
bands indicate the range of values realistically possible for the true regression line 
and individual observations respectively. 
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Bounds on the Estimate C.I. for Cost ($/LF) P.I. for Cost ($/LF)
Level 0.95 Level 0.95
Flow (gpm) Cost ($/LF) Lower Upper Lower Upper
0 72,548.00    34,399.22   110,696.78 20,386.39   124,709.61   
500 81,837.00    53,156.39   110,517.61 36,141.47   127,532.53   
1000 91,126.00    70,080.18   112,171.82 49,792.84   132,459.16   
2500 118,993.00  90,312.39   147,673.61 73,297.47   164,688.53   
5000 165,438.00  84,707.92   246,168.08 77,217.54   253,658.46    
Table 9.   Upper and Lower Bounds on Pump Station Construction Cost Estimates 
Using Simple First-Order Model.  Using a 5,000 gpm pump as an example, we 
compute the base cost of each station to be $165,438.  The 95% confidence 
interval predicts that the true regression estimate is realistically between $84,708 
and $246,168 (±48.8%).  On the other hand, if we could look at more historical 
data on this size of pump we would not expect the project costs for these new 
observations to cost more than $253,658 or less than $77,218 each (±53.3%). 
 
When building a relatively short pipeline, the cost of a single pumping station can 
double the total cost of the project.  However, based on the average maximum capacity 
and pipeline length in the Iraqi crude oil distribution network, pump stations only account 
for 20% of the total cost of a typical Iraqi expansion project.   
 
Accounting for differences between water and crude oil pump stations: 
Pumping oil is not the same as pumping water.  The viscosity of crude oil is much 
higher and petroleum presents additional concerns such as venting gas, etc.  We assume 
the cost of building an oil pumping station to be twice as much as a water pumping 
station and apply a pump complexity factor of 2.0 to all pump station estimates.  A water 
pumping station, for example, that costs $630,000 each, inflates to an oil pumping station 
costing $1,260,000 each.  
 
C. ESTIMATING THE TIME TO COMPLETE A PROJECT AND THE 
COST OF ACCELERATING ITS COMPLETION 
Every project requires some amount of planning time to survey the routes, 
analyze the physical requirements of the network, order materials and stage them, etc.  
We assume that because the majority of eligible Iraqi projects are for existing or 
abandoned pipelines, much of the engineering analysis required is already available.  We 
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also assume a very high degree of national will on the part of the Iraqi government to see 
these projects through to completion once a decision is made to begin.  In consideration 
of the significant benefits to be gained from the early completion of some projects we 
consider the possibility of accelerating (also referred to as “crashing”) them whenever 
this is feasible and cost effective. 
We compute normal project durations as follows:  a fixed project planning time 
[time] + (pipeline length [distance]/speed of advance [distance/time])*pipe size factor 
[unitless] + (number of pump stations [EACH]/pump station construction rate 
[EACH/time]) = duration [time].   
 
Crashing a Construction Project: 
Crashing a project increases estimated costs by 20% per quarter of reduced 
duration.  The methods used for calculating these project durations are based on historical 
project data. 
 
1. Assumptions Regarding a Normal Duration Project 
We assume a planning period of 14 days per 62 mi of pipeline + (40 mi/month 
base rate of advance) times a pipe size factor (1.0 for pipes <= 18", 1.1 for pipes > 18", 
and 1.2 for pipes >45") + 30 days per pump station.  Any fraction of a quarter is rounded 
up. 
 
2. Assumptions Regarding Crashing a Project 
We assume a planning period of 21 days per 62 mi of pipeline + (81 mi/month 
base rate of advance with double the workforce) times a pipe size factor (1.0 for pipes <= 
18", 1.1 for pipes > 18", and 1.2 for pipes >45".  There is no pump station penalty.  Any 
fraction of a quarter is rounded up. 
 
D. A COMPARISON OF OUR COST ESTIMATES WITH OTHER 
PIPELINE PROJECTS  
When we compare our cost estimates against three other well-known pipeline 
projects, we find our approximations to be very reasonable.  For the purpose of 
standardization, all cost estimates are adjusted for inflation to a base year of 2007 using 
Navy military construction purchasing indices [U.S. Navy, 2005]. 
 
1. Trans-Afghanistan Pipeline 
In 1998 UNOCAL obtained construction contracts for the Trans-Afghanistan 
Pipeline that authorized the engineering design and first stages of construction for what 
proponents of the project called a modern continuation of the “Silk Road”.  Two years 
later UNOCAL pulled out after the Taliban became unmanageable.  The total cost of this 
project is estimated today at $3 billion ($FY05) [Wikipedia, 2005]. 
 
Length: 1040 miUS = 5,491,200 ftUS 
Diameter: 42” 
Capacity: 1.0 mbbd ~ 30,000 gpm 
Pump Stations: 12 
Pump Station Complexity Factor: 2.0 
Published Cost: 2.5B (FY98$) and 3.0B (FY05$) 
Area Cost Factor (ACF): 1.5 (Afghanistan) 
Project Complexity Factor: 1.0 
Table 10.   Characteristics of the Trans-Afghanistan Pipeline.  Because pipe size is less 
than 45” we use the simple first-order model to calculate a pipe cost of $376 per 
linear foot.  The capacity of the pipeline is 1.0 mbbd and equivalent to 
approximately 30,000 gpm rounded up.  Using this value we compute each pump 
station to cost $1.3 million (including a 2.0 oil-rather-than-water cost inflation).  
An ACF of 1.5 is applied to the sum total of pipe and pumping station costs.  
Lastly, a project complexity factor of 1.0 – indicating the project is of the same 
complexity in terms of geography and engineering efforts required as that of 
pipelines in Iraq - is applied to the sum total of all costs to yield an estimated total 
of 3.12 (FY07$B) for the entire project. 
 
Cost of Pipeline Construction: 
  ( )8.66 9.16 42" diameter 5, 491, 200 ftUS 2.065 (FY07$B)− + ⋅ =⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦
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Cost of Pump Station Construction:  
 [ ]1040 mi arc length / 90 mi / pump station 11.56 12 pump stations= ≅  
  ( )( )( ) ( ) (
72,548 18.58 30,000 gpm $629,888 each
629,888 12 pump stations 2.0 p/s complexity 0.015 FY07$B
⎡ ⎤+ =⎣ ⎦
⋅ ⋅ = )
Accounting for Area Cost Factor: 
 ( ) ( )2.065 0.015 1.5 3.12 FY07$B+ ⋅ =  
Project Complexity Factor: 
 We use a project complexity factor as a circumspect adjustment to the 
total project cost to account for unique construction requirements such as burying 
a pipeline, providing unique external coatings or cathodic protection, or other 
unusual structural enhancements needed to traverse geographic features (bridges, 
tunnels, etc).  A project complexity factor of 1.0 indicates that this project is 
considered comparable in complexity to a typical pipeline constructed in Iraq. 
 ( )( ) ( )3.12 FY07$B 1.0 3.12 FY07$B=  
Comparison between our cost estimate and those published: 
 Normalizing the published cost of the project yields: $3.0B (FY05) Æ 
$3.12B (FY07), which is an exact match.  Note that a different published estimate 
made by UNICAL in 1998 was $2.5B that normalizes to $2.9B (CY07). 
Assuming that the most recent estimate is really just a rounded approximation, the 
model is still within 8% of the earlier estimate. 
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2. Trans-Alaska Pipeline System 
The 800-mile-long Trans Alaska Pipeline System is one of the largest pipeline 
systems in the world. It stretches from Prudhoe Bay on Alaska’s North Slope, through 
rugged terrain, to Valdez, the northernmost ice-free port in North America.  Since 
pipeline startup in 1977, the pipeline operator Alyeska Pipeline Service Company has 
successfully transported over 14 billion barrels of oil (Alyeska, 2005). 
 
Length: 800 miUS = 4,224,000 ftUS 
Diameter: 48” 
Capacity: 2.0 mbbd ~ 60,000 gpm 
Pump Stations: 12 
Pump Station Complexity Factor: 2.0 
Published Cost: 8.0 (FY77$B) 
Area Cost Factor (ACF): 1.9 (Alaska) 
Project Complexity Factor: 4.0 
Table 11.   Characteristics of the Trans-Alaska Pipeline.  Because pipe size is greater than 
45” we use the second-order polynomial model to calculate a pipe cost of $679 
per linear foot.  The capacity of the pipeline is 2.0 mbbd and equivalent to 
approximately 60,000 gpm rounded up.  Using this value we compute each pump 
station to cost $2.4 million (including a 2.0 pump oil-rather-than-water cost 
inflation ).  An ACF of 1.9 is applied to the sum total of pipe and pumping station 
costs.  Lastly, a project complexity factor of 4.0 is applied to the sum total of all 
costs to yield an estimated total of 22.0 (FY07$B) for the entire project. 
 
Cost of Pipeline Construction: 
  ( ) ( )27.087 4.35 48" 0.201 48" 4, 224, 000 ftUS 2.868 (FY07$B)⎡ ⎤+ + ⋅ =⎣ ⎦
Cost of Pump Station Construction:  
 [ ]800 mi arc length / 90 mi / pump station 8.89 9 pump stations
However, 12 pump stations were built in 1977.
= ≅  
  ( )( )( ) ( ) (
72,548 18.58 60,000 gpm $1,187,228 each
1,187,228 12 pump stations 2.0 p/s complexity 0.028 FY07$B
⎡ ⎤+ =⎣ ⎦
⋅ ⋅ = )
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Accounting for Area Cost Factor: 
 ( ) ( )2.868 0.028 1.9 5.50 FY07$B+ ⋅ =  
Accounting for Project Complexity: 
( )5.50 4.0 22.0 FY07$B⋅ =  
 The Alaska pipeline project was the first of its kind in 1977 and used the 
prevailing construction techniques and equipment available at that time.  Along 
nearly half of it 800-mile length the pipeline is buried at depths ranging from 8 to 
49 feet.  Approximately 4 miles of the pipeline is refrigerated to prevent melting 
of the permafrost.  The entire length of pipeline crosses 3 earthquake fault lines 
and is engineered to withstand the effects of earthquakes up to Richter magnitude 
8.5.  Additionally, a total of 13 bridges were constructed to traverse rivers and 
other geographic land formations.  Based on the many added complexities unique 
to the Alaska pipeline, as well as accounting for the expected improvement in 
construction equipment and techniques since 1977, we assign a project 
complexity factor of 4.0. 
Comparison between our cost estimate and those published: 
 Normalizing the published value yields: $8.0B (FY77) Æ $22.6B (FY07).  
By comparison, the cost estimation model predicts a cost of $22.0B which is 




3. Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan Pipeline 
The Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline transports crude oil from the oil-rich 
Caspian region to the Turkish port of Ceyhan.  The overland route obviates the need for 
350 tanker cargos per year through the narrow and highly congested Bosporus sea lane.  
Along the way, the pipeline cuts across portions of three countries.  Because of the high 
political instability of the regions traversed, the majority of the pipeline is buried and its 
eight pump stations fenced and provided additional security and surveillance (SPG 
Media, 2005). 
 
Length: 445 km Azerbaijjan = 1,459,600 ftUS 
245 km Georgia = 803,600 ftUS 
1070 km Turkey = 3,158,640 ftUS (@ 42”) 
+     350,960 ftUS (@ 32”)
Diameter: 42” in Azerbaijjan 
46” in Georgia 
42” in Turkey (90% of pipeline) 
32” in Turkey (10% of pipeline) 
Capacity: 1.0 mbbd ~ 30,000 gpm 
Pump Stations: 8 
Pump Station Complexity Factor: 2.0 
Published Cost: 2.9 (FY02$B), revised to 3.5-4.0 (FY05$B) 
Area Cost Factor (ACF): 0.9 (Azerbaijjan) 
0.9 (Georgia) 
0.91 (Turkey) 
Project Complexity Factor: 1.75 
Table 12.   Characteristics of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) Pipeline.  The BTC is the 
longest pipeline in the world and is comprised of multiple diameters of pipe.  We 
estimate cost for all but 245 km using the first-order model.  We use the second-
order polynomial model for the rest.  Capacity is a constant 1.0 mbbd and 
equivalent to 30,000 gpm rounded up.  We compute the cost of each pump station 
to be $1.3 million (including a 2.0 oil-rather-than-water cost inflation).  The ACF 
varies within each country but is approximately 0.9 and is applied to the sum total 
of pipe and pumping station costs.  Lastly, a project complexity factor of 1.75 to 
the sum total of all costs to yield an estimated total of 3.75 (FY07$B) for the 
entire project. 
 
Cost of Pipeline Construction: 
 
( )




8.66 9.16 42" diameter 1, 459,600 ftUS 0.549
7.087 4.35 46" 0.201 46" 803,600 ftUS 0.508
8.66 9.16 42" diameter 3,158,640 ftUS 1.188




− + ⋅ =⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦
⎡ ⎤+ + ⋅ =⎣ ⎦
− + ⋅ =⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦









Cost of Pump Station Construction:  
 There are 2 pump stations in Azerbaijjan, 2 in Georgia, and 4 in Turkey. 
  ( )( )( ) ( ) (
72,548 18.58 30,000 gpm $629,888 each
629,888 8 pump stations 2.0 p/s complexity 0.010 FY07$B
⎡ ⎤+ =⎣ ⎦
⋅ ⋅ = )







0.549 0.00252 0.9 0.496
0.508 0.00252 0.9 0.459
1.188 0.00378 0.91 1.084












Accounting for Project Complexity: 
( )2.14 1.75 3.75 FY07$B⋅ =  
 The entire length of the pipeline has cathodic protection that adds 14% to 
the estimated cost [Ghosh, 2005a].  Additionally, the majority of the pipeline is 
buried at depths ranging from 3 to 30 feet (unlike the Iraqi pipelines which are 
currently built above ground) and this contributes an additional 50-60% in 
pipeline construction cost per linear foot.   Finally, the cost of reimbursing 
citizens for right-of-way use is not accounted for in the Iraq cost estimates 
because the majority of Iraq’s pipelines either pre-exist or would be built over 
current rights-of-way.  However, the companies building the BTC spent $133 
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million to acquire similar rights [SPG Media, 2005] and this adds an additional 
6% to the total cost.  Based on these additional circumstances, we assign a 
complexity factor of 1.75 to estimate the total cost. 
Comparison between our cost estimate and those published: 
 Normalizing the published the 2002 value yields: $2.9B (FY02) Æ $3.52B 
(FY07).  By comparison, the cost estimation model predicts a cost of $3.75B 
which is within 7 percent of the published values. 
 
E. EFFECTIVENESS OF INSURGENT ATTACKS AND THE MITIGATING 
EFFECTS OF DEFENSIVE MEASURES 
 
1. The Penalty Cost (vij) Resulting From an Arc Attack 
Our objective is measured in units of exported oil flow.  Our penalty cost (or 
damage) following an attack on an arc in the network is expressed as a fraction of this 
export oil volume.  This penalty depends on whether the arc represents a typical pipeline, 
a node, or an offshore terminal.  A penalty value of zero indicates an invulnerable arc or 
node section, and no penalty can exceed 1.0, or total destruction.  A value of 0.056 is 
equivalent to a 5-day stoppage over a 90-day planning quarter, and applies to attacks 
against normal above-ground pipeline sections.  Pipelines are easy to repair and the 
duration of 5 days is consistent with recent experiences in Iraq using rapid repair teams.  
A value of 0.333 is equivalent to a stoppage of 30 days and applies to attacks against 
control valves and pumping stations, which are much more difficult to repair.  30 days 
assumes spare components are available or could be fabricated quickly.  Offshore loading 
terminals are estimated to be the hardest to repair, and are set at 0.666 (equivalent to a 
loss of 60 days out of a 90-day planning quarter).  
 
2. Defense Effectiveness (dij) for an Attacked Arc 
Our defense effectiveness represents the fraction of oil flow at risk from an attack 
that is protected by a defense measure.  For an arc with vulnerability 0.056, a defensive 
effectiveness of 0.022 corresponds to a 2 day (40%) reduction in the effectiveness of an 
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attack.  For a pumping station with vulnerability 0.333, a defensive effectiveness of 0.333 
corresponds to a 30 day reduction (100%) in attack effectiveness against a well-defended 
feature.  Defensive actions to protect offshore terminals are also considered 100% 
effective. 
A surface pipeline is long and vulnerable and a determined terrorist will 
presumably always succeed in blowing it up somewhere along its route.  By comparison, 
the control valves, pumping stations and offshore terminals occupy a much smaller space 
and are easier to monitor, patrol and harden.  Given sufficient defensive resources we 
believe these features can be sufficiently protected to either deter a would-be aggressor or 
to defeat actual attacks. 
 
F. ESTIMATING DEFENSE COSTS 
We estimate defense costs for pipelines to be $10,000 per mile per quarter.  This 
is 10 times the cost Erinys, the first of several private security firms hired to protect 
Iraq’s oil infrastructure, paid local tribesmen and trained Iraqi guards to do this job 
[Barazanji, 2004]. 
We estimate the cost of protecting pumping stations, control valves and other 
critical facilities as a function of maximum daily pumping capacity, and assign a cost of 
$100,000 per mbbl per day.  For instance, the Zubair pumping station with an estimated 
daily flow rate of 6.2 mbbd costs $620,000 per quarter to defend. 
 
G. CONSEQUENCES OF ELASTIC BUDGET CONSTRAINTS 
If we require our investment budget to be spent exactly and uniformly -- quarter-
by-quarter over our planning horizon -- then given the discrete investment and defense 
options available we will almost surely find no feasible solution.  By allowing 
unavoidable under- and/or over-expenditures each quarter, albeit at some penalty per unit 
of such budget violation, we admit budget-feasible solutions.  Then, by using cumulative 
budget constraints, any under- or over-expenditure accrues from one planning period to 
the next, and continues to exact penalties until expenditures retain the cumulative goal.  
This reflects what project planners and managers actually do in practice when they need 
some budget flexibility to ensure continuity of operations. 
In this model, the cumulative elastic budget violation penalties are very high -- 
they are essentially infinite for over-expenditures.  As a result, the model has a 
predisposition to under spend.  The penalty functions are set as follows in the 
optimization model: 
 
_ ( ) 100000000.0 * (1000.0 /1000000.0) * (1.0 / _ )
*exp(-0.02 * (( ( ) -1.0) / 4.0))
_ ( )




= ∞  
Here, q is the ordinal planning quarter, and the lower penalty is inflated at a rate 
of 2% per year. 
 
Both the upper and lower penalties are in kbbl of flow lost per million dollars 
over- or under-spent (i.e., oil export units per unit of budget violation). 
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IV. RESULTS AND INSIGHTS 
A. DESCRIPTION OF SCENARIOS 
We present five scenarios: Baseline, Big Attack, Really Big Attack, Construction 
Cost Plus, and Defense Cost Plus.  Each scenario shares the same initial state of the 
network arcs, their starting material conditions, and the opportunity to construct new arcs 
and defend existing ones.  We alter the first case, Baseline, by systematically changing 
scalar parameters shown in Table 13 to produce the remaining excursions.  We use these 
parameters to define the scope and intensity of insurgent attacks, and the relative costs of 
construction and defense.  Another parameter, oil_price, is set to $50 per barrel for all 
excursions.  Although altering this has obvious effects on the conversion of oil export 
units into dollars, we are more interested in the allocation of available budget between 
construction and defense for various threat levels than in forecasting oil prices.  If the 
price of oil varies, the affordable tempo of our plan changes, but the qualitative allocation 
of resources to re-build and/or defend oil infrastructure does not. 
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The key factors used in each run are summarized in Table 13.   
 







epoch_q 2 2 2 2 2 
epoch_attacks 5 15 50 5 5 
atks_by_q 10 15 30 10 10 
mx_atks 300 500 500 300 300 
atks_by_n_by_q 5 5 5 5 5 
Construction factor 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.5 1.0 
Defense factor 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.5 
Table 13.   Summary of Key Model Parameters.  The first five italicized settings are 
control parameters that govern the frequency and intensity of insurgent attacks 
over the planning horizon, and the last two adjust construction and defense costs 
respectively as listed in Appendix D.  In the Defense Cost Plus scenario, each arc 
may be attacked at most 5 times in any 2-quarter epoch of the planning horizon. 
There can be at most ten attacks per quarter on any arc, and at most 300 attacks 
over the entire 40-quarter planning horizon.  In any planning quarter, all arcs 
incident to any given node may be attacked at most 5 times.  Construction costs 
are not inflated, but defense costs are 150% of Baseline. 
 
We define these settings as follows: 
epoch_q – The length of time, in planning quarters, over which we wish to limit 
the number of insurgent attacks.  We set epoch_q to 2 in each excursion presented, to 
represent that repeated attacks against any target over such a short time period results in 
better preparedness by the defenders. 
epoch_attacks – The maximum number of times that a particular arc may be 
attacked in any epoch of epoch_q quarters.  Increasing this parameter allows insurgents to 
attack an arc more frequently, however we assert that attackers cannot exceed it without 
alerting defenders to adapt and render the target essentially invulnerable.  The scenarios 
Big Attack and Really Big Attack, respectively increase this number by 300% and 1,000% 
of Baseline. 
atks_by_q – Maximum number of insurgent attacks per planning quarter.  In the 
Baseline scenario we set this value at 10 and inflate it in Big Attacks and Really Big 
Attacks by 50% and 300% respectively. 
mx_atks – The maximum number of attacks that may be conducted over the 40-
quarter planning horizon.  For Baseline, this is 300, or slightly more than the total number 
of real attacks conducted to date since 2003 [IAGS, 2005].  Big Attacks and Really Big 
Attacks increase this to 500. 
atks_by_n_by_q – Limits the number of attacks that can be mounted against all 
adjoining arcs incident to any one model node.  This shows how to limit the intensity of 
attacks on a small geographic area, where it is easier to mount joint defenses of adjacent 
arcs.  We set this value at 5. 
Construction factor – This term dictates by what factor we increase or decrease 
all construction costs.  For instance, a factor of 1.5 increases construction costs shown in 
Appendix D by 50%. 
Defense factor – This term dictates by what factor we increase or decrease 
defense costs.  For instance, a factor of 1.7 increases defense costs shown in Appendix D 
by 70%. 
, ,i j qattacks  - This term is not shown in Table 14, but limits the attacks on each arc 
in each quarter.  Reasoning that insurgents will not mount attacks that have no effect, we 
use this to limit attacks to a number that causes no more than 100% reduction of flow.  
This term can also be used to govern the number of attacks based on expert judgment. 
We present these control parameters as simple examples for governing model 
behavior by, for instance, converting intelligence estimates into simple constraints that 
shape insurgent attacks.  Because we model interdictions as an integer linear program, we 
can accommodate much more general guidance than this. 
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B. RESULTS FROM THE TRI-LEVEL OPTIMIZATION OF INDIVIDUAL 
SCENARIOS 
Key outputs from the five optimizations are summarized in Tables 14, 15 and 16.  
We break these down into three areas – the contributions from defensive measures, the 
limits of defensive measures, and the contributions of capital expansion.  
We ran each of the five scenarios in GAMS [GAMS, 2003] for 50 decomposition 
iterations using CPLEX 9.0 [ILOG, 2004] with a relative integer tolerance (OPTCR) set 
to 0.10.  Each scenario requires approximately 3 hours to run on a 2 GHz Pentium 4 
workstation with 1.0 GB of random access memory. 
Baseline Big Attacks






Arc/Nodes Attacked 292                  496                  499                  293                  292                  
Flow Lost (kbbl) 5,023,125        9,783,135        14,116,118      5,073,930        4,133,723        
Arc/Nodes Defended 1,576               1,951               1,904               1,467               1,016               
Flow Saved (kbbl) -                   336,699           775,170           990                  -                   
Upper Bound (kbbl) 24,491,250      23,958,000      23,460,750      23,989,500      24,437,250      
Achieved Flow (kbbl) 23,856,750      23,067,000    23,222,250    23,548,500    23,193,000      
Lower Bound (kbbl) 16,728,288      9,910,773        3,856,921        17,055,746      18,021,990      
Estimated Market Value ($M) 1,192,838        1,153,350      1,161,113      1,177,425      1,159,650        
* Assuming price of oil is $50/barrel  
Table 14.   Summary of Attacks, Defenses, and Oil Exports.  The Baseline scenario suffers 
292 attacks (out of a maximum of 300) during the 40-quarter planning horizon.  
These attacks prevent over 5 billion barrels of oil from reaching an export 
terminal, though 23.9 billion barrels do reach export destinations and have a 
market value of nearly $1.2 trillion.  Over the planning horizon we defend 1,576 
arc-quarters, but this results in no direct flow savings because the attackers, 
knowing our defense plans a priori, choose to attack undefended arcs:  Insurgents 











Full Expansion Cost (CY07$M) 4,468.06         4,468.06         4,468.06         6,702.09         4,468.06         
Budget (120% Expansion Cost) 5,361.67         5,361.67       5,361.67       8,042.50       5,361.67         
Expansion Costs (CY07$M) 4,076.07         4,076.07         4,076.07         6,527.39         4,721.81         
Defense Costs (CY07$M) 662.24            763.43            843.18            594.14            610.70            
Total Costs 4,738.31   4,839.50 4,919.25 7,121.53 5,332.51   
Budget - Costs (CY07$M) 623.36           522.17          442.42          920.97           29.16              
Table 15.   Summary of Construction and Defense Plans.  The budget for each scenario is 
estimated to be sufficient to fully expand the Iraqi oil distribution network, and is 
then inflated 20% to accommodate the cost of defenses and/or project 
acceleration.  None of the five scenarios, including Defense Cost Plus, elect to 
complete all the candidate capacity expansion investments.  Rather, the 
optimization applies the available funds to accelerate completion of key capacity 
expansion arcs.  Each scenario dedicates about 12% of its total budget to defense, 
and this increases proportionally with the rise in insurgent activity.  The unspent 
amounts on the bottom line are an artifact of our reluctance to allow any over-
expenditure and the sheer size of the discrete investment options available.  In 
reality, we would find some constructive way to use these funds. 
 
All scenarios choose defensive measures to limit the effects of insurgent attacks.  
While each scenario achieves more than 6 million barrels per day in planned export 
capacity by the end of the 40-quarter planning horizon (see Appendix H for a detailed 
breakdown of the quarterly flow volumes achieved), the Defense Cost Plus scenario 
spends 50% more on defense, but schedules 709 fewer defense actions and suffers a 2.8% 
decrease in total flow in relation to Baseline.  Big Attacks and Really Big Attacks also 
export less oil (an average decrease of 3.0%), but this decrease is small in comparison to 
the significant increases in attacks.  An increase in defense costs permits fewer defense 
actions and inflicts the largest overall decrease in export potential:  This appears to be a 
key exogenous factor. 
Table 16 shows that, surprisingly, the net oil export difference between these five 
diverse scenarios is less than 3.5%.  The ratio of attacks to defenses appears to be a good 












Baseline 23,856,750      292 1576 0.540               0.185               
Construction Cost Plus 23,548,500      293 1467 0.502               0.200               
Really Big Attacks 23,222,250      499 1904 0.652               0.262               
Defense Cost Plus 23,193,000      292 1016 0.348               0.287               
Big Attacks 23,067,000      496 1951 0.668               0.254                
Table 16.   Summary of Factors Contributing to Achievable Flow.  This table presents in 
descending order the amount of achieved export flow, and shows that the 
“percentage of arcs defended” is a poor indicator of future flow (i.e. the two 
lowest flow models have both the best and worst defense percentages).  We 
consider the ratio of attacks to defenses the best of the 4 candidate predictors 
shown.  Using this ratio as a basis for evaluating the 5 scenarios we predict that 
Baseline produces the highest flow and Defense Cost Plus produces the lowest.  
That Big Attacks is slightly more damaging than Defense Cost Plus (~0.5% less 
flow) does not change the overall conclusion that funding defensive measures is 
important.  The difference in flow between both scenarios is less than the interval 
of uncertainty offered by our decomposition – that is, this difference is not large 
enough to be significant. 
 
 Figure 8 shows the inverse relationship between flow volume and the ratio of 
attacks to defenses.  The dashed line represents the linear regression of the five data 
points, and we provide it as an indicator of the overall trend and not necessarily because 
we believe a linear relationship exists.  But, we are confident that a continuation of the 
downward trend will occur with any increase in the ratio of attacks to defenses. 
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Figure 8. Relating Flow Volume to the Ratio of Attacks to Defenses.  This illustrates the 
evident inverse relationship between total flow and the ratio of attacks to 
defenses.  The dashed line represents the first-order regression of the five 
optimized scenario observations, but we show it merely as an indicator of the 
overall trend and not because we believe there is a particular linear relationship.  
 
Given resources to defend “everything - all the time”, the Iraqi network is by its 
design still vulnerable.  Iraq’s oil pipelines are hundreds of miles long, and all are built 
above-ground. These offer attractive target points virtually anywhere along their length.  
We acknowledge this vulnerability by assigning defense effectiveness factors 
( ) to normal pipelines that do not fully offset the effects of an insurgent’s 
attack ( ).  Based on the optimal 40-quarter build profiles of our five scenarios 
(see Appendices I through M) we find that on average the Iraqi network only has 2,920 
possible defense opportunities for the model to consider.  This suggests that if the number 
of attacks is unconstrained, that in any scenario with imperfect defenses (i.e. d
0.022ijd ≡
0.056ijv ≡
ij < vij) 
when given enough attacks the benefits of “defending everything” can be overcome. 
Using the maximum of 2,920 possible defenses, we project that insurgents need only 
mount 876 attacks over the next 10 years, to achieve an attack to defense ratio of 0.30 - 
which is higher than any of the other scenarios presented thus far.  If the present rate of 
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attacks in Iraq is sustained, conceivably the insurgents could mount over 1,000 
interdictions in the next 10 years [IAGS, 2005]. 
Capacity expansion also provides system robustness against a sustained insurgent 
campaign.  The expanded capacity and redundancy that is gained each quarter provides 
new targets for the insurgents, but also offers new degrees of freedom to respond to these 
attacks by redirecting flow. Figure 9 illustrates the maximum capacity of the fully-
upgraded Iraqi oil network in quarter 40 if we do not allow new and/or redundant 
construction (~5.3 mbbd).  This network can export 2.5 mbbd less flow than the Baseline 
model, and is completely interdictable by focusing attacks on the junctions at Zubair and 
Parallel (2) or upon the four pipelines indicated by the dashed line.  By adding 
redundancy and additional capacity we create opportunities to redirect flow along 
uninterdicted arcs and to use larger residual capacity after attack damage is repaired.  We 
observe this behavior in scenarios Baseline and Defense Cost Plus (Table 14) when 
attack intensity is moderate and construction rates are higher. 
We provide a condensed view of the complete solution to the Baseline scenario 
over the 40-quarter planning horizon in Appendix N.  The graphic focuses principally on 
the expansion of the pipeline (including capacity upgrades) and the distribution of attacks 
and defenses.  Facilities and junctions are indicated only as references.  Each pipeline is 
represented by a set of four numbers inside parentheses.  These values indicate the 
following:   
 
(X, - , - , - ) ‘0’ indicates the pipeline is pre-existing.  ‘1’ indicates the pipeline 
is new construction. 
( - ,X, - , - ) Indicates the quarter in which the pipeline is either upgraded or 
new construction begins.  A value of ‘-’ indicates no capital 
expansion project is initiated during the planning horizon. 
( - , - ,X, - ) Indicates the number of quarters this particular pipeline is 
defended during the planning horizon. 
( - , - , - ,X) Indicates the number of times the pipeline is attacked.  This value 
can not exceed epoch_attacks.  
 
In the Baseline scenario, the optimization model consistently defends 
infrastructure across the board, but allocates the majority of its quarterly budget to 
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upgrading existing infrastructure.  On average, the model defends each arc about once 
every two quarters over the 40-quarter planning horizon, and the attacks consistently 
chase the larger flows within the network.  As new export routes are completed and flow 
rates dramatically increase, not surprisingly so do the frequency of attacks.  Over a period 
extending from quarter 11 to quarter 25, the insurgents mount an average of 9.7 attacks 
per quarter (compared to an average of 3.7 during the previous 10 quarters).  By quarter 
18, the balance of export flow that now primarily leaves the country through southern 
terminals returns to a more even distribution among the nine export points.  In all five 
scenarios, the percentage of oil leaving the country through the two offshore loading 
facilities (frequent targets for the model) is decreased from 90% (Feld, 2005b) to a more 
flexible and defendable 40-45%.  






















































































s-t cut = 477,000 kbbl
≈ 5,300 kbbl/day
 
Figure 9. Illustration of the Limiting Effects of Not Allowing New Construction and 
Redundancy.  This network diagram demonstrates the value of adding additional 
capacity and redundancy to the distribution network.  Shown above are all the 
major pipelines and junctions, and their flow capacities (kbbl per quarter), at the 
end of the 40-quarter planning horizon if we do not allow for new construction.  
This network has a maximum capacity of 5,300 kbbd which is 2,425 kbbd below 
that of the Baseline scenario.  Additionally, this network is completely 
interdictable by focusing attacks on the junctions at Zubair and Parallel (2) or 




V. LESSONS LEARNED, RECOMMENDATIONS AND FUTURE 
WORK 
A. REFLECTIONS ON GAMS AND THE TRI-LEVEL MODEL 
Iraq’s oil sector is unique from an infrastructure perspective and it lends itself to 
the application of the tri-level model.  Unlike many regions of the world, Iraq has both a 
need and motivation to massively improve and expand its infrastructure over a reasonably 
long planning horizon.   At the same time it must balance the need for added expansion 
with defensive measures to offset the anticipated moves of its enemies.  In each of our 
five scenarios, Iraq’s oil industry can increase production over the next ten years to more 
than the 3 million barrels per day objective established at the end of Operation Iraqi 
Freedom.  Each scenario demonstrates a different mixture of capacity expansion and 
defenses to withstand a sustained insurgent campaign.  The fraction of total expenditures 
devoted to defense is surprisingly stable in these cases:  about 12%. 
Defenses are critical, and the way we defend is equally important.  Our key 
assumption when estimating defensive effectiveness (dij) for a pipeline is that we simply 
cannot hope to stop a determined attack.  There are too many lines over too much 
distance to defend.  However, oil pipelines can be built that are much harder to attack.  
The Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline is the longest in the world and it traverses some of the 
most politically unstable areas of that region.  To decrease vulnerability to attack, 
engineers have buried its entire length.  This dramatically increases the time and 
difficulty of mounting an attack, and thus gives the defender added opportunity to detect 
and defeat such attacks. 
Iraq could bury its oil pipelines at an increased cost of 50-60%.  Cathodic 
protection would increase this cost by about another 14%.  We conjecture that such 




B. ADDITIONAL RESEARCH TO BE ACCOMPLISHED 
Iraq’s oil industry can withstand a sizeable sustained insurgency targeting its oil 
infrastructure if they follow through with some type of capital expansion and defense 
plan.  We provide a general outline of how this might occur.  However, additional work 
needs to be done determining what realistic construction and defense costs are and 
validating the quality of the estimation techniques.  This will prove useful in establishing 
solid upper and lower bounds on the objective function of the model.  Additionally, the 
values used for the vij and dij are notional.  Simulation may prove useful in determining 
better values for these, though historical data from rapid pipeline repair teams and Baku-
Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline is likely to be available in the near future. We may want to 
consider more than three different damage functions (those against normal pipelines, 
those against pump stations and control valves and those against the terminals located in 
the Persian Gulf) to account for different levels of attack.  For example, we might 
consider allowing attackers 1-2 large attacks that inflict greater damage than any others. 
APPENDIX A.  SUMMARY OF GAMS ID’S, COMMON NAMES 
AND GEOGRAPHIC LOCATIONS 
We assign each junction (node) in the Iraqi oil distribution network an identifier 
(used in GAMS), a common name, and a location in degrees of Latitude and Longitude.  
We employ an activity-on-arc model: the analogy between a length of oil pipe and an arc 
is obvious.  But we also represent point-locations such as tank farms, pumping stations, 
and control valves as arcs.  Any common name ending with (A) has a corresponding 
location with the same name ending in (B).  Together the two locations produce an entry 
and exit node connected by a capacitated arc representing the volume of crude pumped 
per day.  For example, East Baghdad field (A) and East Baghdad Field (B) represent the 
entry and exit points to the same location (sharing the same latitude and longitude). 
 
Gams ID Node Common Name Lat Long
ns Global Source -- --
n02 Rumaila 30.5333 47.4500
n03 East Baghdad field (A) 33.1148 44.5724
n04 East Baghdad field (B) 33.1148 44.5724
n05 Kirkuk (A) 35.4667 44.3920
n06 Kirkuk (B) 35.4667 44.3920
n07 Jambur 35.1608 44.5254
n08 Bai-Hassan 35.5992 44.2595
n09 P-3 pump station at field 32.0501 47.3103
n10 Khanaqin 34.4927 45.4172
n11 Bayji (A)                             34.9729 43.6023
n12 Bayji (B)                             34.9729 43.6023
n13 Samawah (A)                           31.3000 45.2833
n14 Samawah (B)                           31.3000 45.2833
n15 Daura (A)                             33.0939 44.3064
n16 Daura (B)                             33.0939 44.3064
n17 Nasiriya(A)                           31.0333 46.2667
n18 Nasiriya(B)                           31.0333 46.2667
n19 Naft Khaneh (A)                       34.1795 45.4641
n20 Naft Khaneh (B)                       34.1795 45.4641
n21 Al Fatha Bridge (A)                   35.0564 43.6336
n22 Al Fatha Bridge (B)                   35.0564 43.6336
n23 parallel section Surf/sub (1A)        36.2500 42.7500
n24 parallel section Surf/sub (1B)        36.2500 42.7500
n25 Parallel Mid Section (under)          36.1500 43.0000
n26 parallel section sub/Surf (2A)        35.9667 42.8500
n27 parallel section sub/Surf (2B)        35.9667 42.8500  
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Gams ID Node Common Name Lat Long
n28 Latifah Depot (A)                     32.9896 44.4472
n29 Latifah Depot (B)                     32.9896 44.4472
n30 Fao Tank Farm (A)                     30.2547 48.1864
n31 Fao Tank Farm (B)                     30.2547 48.1864
n32 IT-2 pump station (A)                 36.0793 43.0860
n33 IT-2 pump station (B)                 36.0793 43.0860
n34 IT-1A pump station (A)                35.0146 43.5398
n35 IT-1A pump station (B)                35.0146 43.5398
n36 K-2 Pump Station (A)                  34.7432 43.3677
n37 K-2 Pump Station (B)                  34.7432 43.3677
n38 IT-2A pump station (A)                36.9144 42.7419
n39 IT-2A pump station (B)                36.9144 42.7419
n40 Zubair-2 (Zb-2) pumping station (A)   30.2756 48.1551
n41 Zubair-2 (Zb-2) pumping station (B)   30.2756 48.1551
n42 K-3 pump station (Haditha) (A)        34.0752 42.5698
n43 K-3 pump station (Haditha) (B)        34.0752 42.5698
n44 PS-4 pump station (A)                 33.0522 43.5554
n45 PS-4 pump station (B)                 33.0522 43.5554
n46 PS-3 pump station (Karbala) (A)       31.7996 44.3690
n47 PS-3 pump station (Karbala) (B)       31.7996 44.3690
n48 PS-2 pump station (A)                 31.1667 45.5000
n49 PS-2 pump station (B)                 31.1667 45.5000
n50 IPSA-2 pump station (A)               29.6493 46.6063
n51 IPSA-2 pump station (B)               29.6493 46.6063
n52 IT-1 Pump Station(Israel Split) (A)   34.1378 41.4433
n53 IT-1 Pump Station(Israel Split) (B)   34.1378 41.4433
n54 Turkish Border Crossing               37.2484 42.5698
n55 Kuwait Crossing                       30.1921 48.1239
n56 Saudi Arabia Border                   29.2317 46.5124
n57 Syria Crossing                        34.2839 40.9270
n58 Jordan Border Crossing                32.8643 39.1434
n59 Iran Crossing                         30.9854 47.8422
n60 Al Basra (Al Bakra) terminal          30.0251 48.4211
n61 Khor al-Amaya terminal                30.0459 48.4211
n62 Shuaiba (Umm Qasar Terminal)          30.2338 47.5763
nt Global Terminal                       -- --  
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APPENDIX B.  SUMMARY OF PIPELINES AND LENGTHS 
Appendix B is a summary of all the pipelines and the junctions they connect.  
There are 71 physical pipeline segments possible in the Iraq oil distribution network not 
including any modeling artifices that connect global sources (ns) and global terminals 
(nt).  The lengths of the pipelines are initially calculated in nautical miles using the Great 
Circle Distance formula and converted to both U.S. statute miles and U.S. standard feet 
for future reference in the cost estimating model.  
 
From Common Name To Common Name Distance between wp1 and wp2
Lat 1 Long 1 Lat 2 Long 2 naut miles miUS feet (US)
n02 Rumaila n40 Zubair-2 (Zb-2) pu 30.5333 47.4500 30.2756 48.1551 40            46            240,788     
n03 East Baghdad fie n04 East Baghdad field 33.1148 44.5724 33.1148 44.5724 -           -           -             
n04 East Baghdad fie n28 Latifah Depot (A)  33.1148 44.5724 32.9896 44.4472 10            11            59,556       
n04 East Baghdad fie n40 Zubair-2 (Zb-2) pu 33.1148 44.5724 30.2756 48.1551 250          288          1,518,480  
n05 Kirkuk (A) n06 Kirkuk (B) 35.4667 44.3920 35.4667 44.3920 -           -           -             
n06 Kirkuk (B) n03 East Baghdad field 35.4667 44.3920 33.1148 44.5724 141          163          859,143     
n06 Kirkuk (B) n21 Al Fatha Bridge (A 35.4667 44.3920 35.0564 43.6336 45            51            270,815     
n07 Jambur n05 Kirkuk (A) 35.1608 44.5254 35.4667 44.3920 19            22            118,371     
n08 Bai-Hassan n05 Kirkuk (A) 35.5992 44.2595 35.4667 44.3920 10            12            62,279       
n09 P-3 pump station n40 Zubair-2 (Zb-2) pu 32.0501 47.3103 30.2756 48.1551 115          132          698,536     
n10 Khanaqin n19 Naft Khaneh (A)   34.4927 45.4172 34.1795 45.4641 19            22            115,052     
n11 Bayji (A)              n12 Bayji (B)                34.9729 43.6023 34.9729 43.6023 -           -           -             
n12 Bayji (B)              n15 Daura (A)             34.9729 43.6023 33.0939 44.3064 118          136          717,282     
n12 Bayji (B)              n34 IT-1A pump statio 34.9729 43.6023 35.0146 43.5398 4              5              24,074       
n12 Bayji (B)              n36 K-2 Pump Station 34.9729 43.6023 34.7432 43.3677 18            21            109,261     
n13 Samawah (A)      n14 Samawah (B)       31.3000 45.2833 31.3000 45.2833 -           -           -             
n14 Samawah (B)      n46 PS-3 pump station 31.3000 45.2833 31.7996 44.3690 56            64            337,429     
n14 Samawah (B)      n48 PS-2 pump station 31.3000 45.2833 31.1667 45.5000 14            16            83,215       
n15 Daura (A)            n16 Daura (B)             33.0939 44.3064 33.0939 44.3064 -           -           -             
n16 Daura (B)            n11 Bayji (A)                33.0939 44.3064 34.9729 43.6023 118          136          717,282     
n17 Nasiriya(A)          n18 Nasiriya(B)           31.0333 46.2667 31.0333 46.2667 -           -           -             
n18 Nasiriya(B)          n40 Zubair-2 (Zb-2) pu 31.0333 46.2667 30.2756 48.1551 108          124          653,480     
n18 Nasiriya(B)          n48 PS-2 pump station 31.0333 46.2667 31.1667 45.5000 40            46            244,228     
n19 Naft Khaneh (A)  n20 Naft Khaneh (B)   34.1795 45.4641 34.1795 45.4641 -           -           -             
n20 Naft Khaneh (B)  n03 East Baghdad field 34.1795 45.4641 33.1148 44.5724 78            90            473,174     
n21 Al Fatha Bridge (A n22 Al Fatha Bridge (B 35.0564 43.6336 35.0564 43.6336 -           -           -             
n22 Al Fatha Bridge ( n11 Bayji (A)                35.0564 43.6336 34.9729 43.6023 5              6              31,844       
n23 parallel section S n24 parallel section Su 36.2500 42.7500 36.2500 42.7500 0              0              0                
n24 parallel section S n38 IT-2A pump statio 36.2500 42.7500 36.9144 42.7419 40            46            242,229     
n25 Parallel Mid Sect n23 parallel section Su 36.1500 43.0000 36.2500 42.7500 14            16            82,087       
n26 parallel section su n27 parallel section su 35.9667 42.8500 35.9667 42.8500 -           -           -             
n27 parallel section su n23 parallel section Su 35.9667 42.8500 36.2500 42.7500 18            20            107,399     
n27 parallel section su n25 Parallel Mid Sectio 35.9667 42.8500 36.1500 43.0000 13            15            80,125       
n28 Latifah Depot (A) n29 Latifah Depot (B)  32.9896 44.4472 32.9896 44.4472 0              0              0                
n29 Latifah Depot (B) n15 Daura (A)             32.9896 44.4472 33.0939 44.3064 9              11            57,423       
n30 Fao Tank Farm (A n31 Fao Tank Farm (B 30.2547 48.1864 30.2547 48.1864 -           -           -             
n31 Fao Tank Farm ( n55 Kuwait Crossing   30.2547 48.1864 30.1921 48.1239 5              6              30,141       
n31 Fao Tank Farm ( n61 Khor al-Amaya ter 30.2547 48.1864 30.0459 48.4211 17            20            106,154     
n31 Fao Tank Farm ( n60 Al Basra (Al Bakra 30.2547 48.1864 30.0251 48.4211 18            21            111,722     
n32 IT-2 pump station n33 IT-2 pump station 36.0793 43.0860 36.0793 43.0860 -           -           -             
n33 IT-2 pump station n26 parallel section su 36.0793 43.0860 35.9667 42.8500 13            15            80,791       
Iraqi Oil Distribution Network
Waypoint 1          
(in decimal degrees)





From Common Name To Common Name Distance between wp1 and wp2
Lat 1 Long 1 Lat 2 Long 2 naut miles miUS feet (US)
n34 IT-1A pump statio n35 IT-1A pump statio 35.0146 43.5398 35.0146 43.5398 -           -           -             
n35 IT-1A pump statio n32 IT-2 pump station 35.0146 43.5398 36.0793 43.0860 68            78            410,830     
n36 K-2 Pump Station n37 K-2 Pump Station 34.7432 43.3677 34.7432 43.3677 -           -           -             
n37 K-2 Pump Station n42 K-3 pump station ( 34.7432 43.3677 34.0752 42.5698 56            65            341,906     
n38 IT-2A pump statio n39 IT-2A pump statio 36.9144 42.7419 36.9144 42.7419 -           -           -             
n39 IT-2A pump statio n54 Turkish Border Cr 36.9144 42.7419 37.2484 42.5698 22            25            131,652     
n40 Zubair-2 (Zb-2) p n41 Zubair-2 (Zb-2) pu 30.2756 48.1551 30.2756 48.1551 -           -           -             
n41 Zubair-2 (Zb-2) p n02 Rumaila 30.2756 48.1551 30.5333 47.4500 40            46            240,788     
n41 Zubair-2 (Zb-2) p n17 Nasiriya(A)           30.2756 48.1551 31.0333 46.2667 108          124          653,480     
n41 Zubair-2 (Zb-2) p n30 Fao Tank Farm (A 30.2756 48.1551 30.2547 48.1864 2              2              12,457       
n41 Zubair-2 (Zb-2) p n50 IPSA-2 pump stati 30.2756 48.1551 29.6493 46.6063 89            102          539,833     
n41 Zubair-2 (Zb-2) p n59 Iran Crossing        30.2756 48.1551 30.9854 47.8422 46            52            276,760     
n41 Zubair-2 (Zb-2) p n62 Shuaiba (Umm Qa 30.2756 48.1551 30.2338 47.5763 30            35            182,906     
n42 K-3 pump station n43 K-3 pump station ( 34.0752 42.5698 34.0752 42.5698 -           -           -             
n43 K-3 pump station n44 PS-4 pump station 34.0752 42.5698 33.0522 43.5554 79            91            478,259     
n43 K-3 pump station n52 IT-1 Pump Station 34.0752 42.5698 34.1378 41.4433 56            65            340,808     
n44 PS-4 pump statio n45 PS-4 pump station 33.0522 43.5554 33.0522 43.5554 0              0              0                
n45 PS-4 pump statio n42 K-3 pump station ( 33.0522 43.5554 34.0752 42.5698 79            91            478,259     
n45 PS-4 pump statio n46 PS-3 pump station 33.0522 43.5554 31.7996 44.3690 86            99            520,779     
n46 PS-3 pump statio n47 PS-3 pump station 31.7996 44.3690 31.7996 44.3690 -           -           -             
n47 PS-3 pump statio n13 Samawah (A)       31.7996 44.3690 31.3000 45.2833 56            64            337,429     
n47 PS-3 pump statio n44 PS-4 pump station 31.7996 44.3690 33.0522 43.5554 86            99            520,779     
n48 PS-2 pump statio n49 PS-2 pump station 31.1667 45.5000 31.1667 45.5000 -           -           -             
n49 PS-2 pump statio n13 Samawah (A)       31.1667 45.5000 31.3000 45.2833 14            16            83,215       
n49 PS-2 pump statio n17 Nasiriya(A)           31.1667 45.5000 31.0333 46.2667 40            46            244,228     
n50 IPSA-2 pump sta n51 IPSA-2 pump stati 29.6493 46.6063 29.6493 46.6063 -           -           -             
n51 IPSA-2 pump sta n56 Saudi Arabia Bord 29.6493 46.6063 29.2317 46.5124 26            29            155,134     
n52 IT-1 Pump Statio n53 IT-1 Pump Station 34.1378 41.4433 34.1378 41.4433 -           -           -             
n53 IT-1 Pump Statio n57 Syria Crossing      34.1378 41.4433 34.2839 40.9270 27            31            164,518     
n53 IT-1 Pump Statio n58 Jordan Border Cro 34.1378 41.4433 32.8643 39.1434 138         159          839,245    
Notes:
1.  The distance between two waypoints is calculated using the great circle formula.
2.  Distance = acos(sin(lat1)*sin(lat2)+cos(lat1)*cos(lat2)*cos(lon1-lon2))
              where all latitudes and longitudes are expressed in radians
3.  1 Nautical mile = 1.852 km (for sea and air navigation) = 1.1508 miUS = 6076.1033 ftUS
Iraqi Oil Distribution Network
Waypoint 1          
(in decimal degrees)





APPENDIX C.  COSTS, DURATIONS AND FACTORS 
This summarizes all the relevant data fields we use to estimate cost and duration 
for each activity in the model.  The specific columns shown are as follows: 
 
From  The origin of flow (GAMS ID) 
To The destination of flow (GAMS ID) 
Pipe size Diameter of the pipe in inches.  Used in calculating pipeline costs. 
Max cap The published or expected capacity in thousands of barrels of oil 
per day (kbbd). Applicable only to pipelines and not junctions.  A 
capacity of 99,999 is a modeling artifice indicating that the 
specified arc segment is a junction and can handle any flows 
entering and exiting it.   
Distance  Length of the pipeline measured in standard U.S. feet.  Used in 
calculating pipeline costs.  A length of “-“ indicates that the 
particular segment is a junction and has zero length.   
# P/S The number of intermediate pump stations required for that 
specific length of pipeline.  A value of 0 indicates either a junction 
or a pipeline segment not long enough to warrant an intermediate 
facility.   
Cost of New The cost of new construction is normalized for fiscal year 2007, 
and represents the full cost to build this pipeline segment.   
Cost to  
Upgrade 50% of the new construction cost and applies to pre-existing 
pipelines with degraded capacities.   
Estimated 
time to  
complete  Represents the normal construction durations [quarters] to 
complete either new construction or upgrades. 
Estimated  
time to crash  
complete Represents the accelerated construction durations [quarters] to 
complete either new construction or upgrades. 
Pipe Size  
Factor Unit-less term used in calculating construction and upgrade 
durations. 
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APPENDIX D.  FINAL GAMS DATA FILE 
This appendix represents the actual data we provide to the GAMS tri-level 
optimization model.  Each column is described as follows: 
 
GAMS ID (i)  The origin of flow.  “ns” indicates generic global source. 
GAMS ID (j) The destination of flow. “nt” indicates a generic global terminal. 
Node Common 
Name (i or j) English description of that particular GAMS ID. 
Old 
Capacity Present-day capacity of the specified pipeline section. [kbbd)] 
Added 
Capacity Amount of flow to be added by initiating a candidate capital 
expansion project on this pipeline segment. [kbbd] 
Earliest 
Start The earliest quarter (q) in the total planning horizon that this 
project can be started.  A value of 0 indicates it may be started any 
time.  A value of 10 indicates it may not be considered as a 
candidate for expansion until quarter 10. 
Latest 
Start The latest quarter (q) in the total planning horizon that this project 
can be started.  A value of 0 indicates it may be started any time.  
Any value here must be greater than or equal to the value indicated 
in the earliest start column. 
Min 
Duration  The “crashed” project duration. [quarters] 
Max 




Build Cost The estimated cost of the particular project.  This value accounts 
for whether or not this project is a new construction or existing 
pipeline upgrade project. [CY$2007M)] 
,i jv   penalty cost ( ,0 i jv≤ ≤ ) [if attacked, fraction of flow interdicted] 
,i jd   defense effectiveness ( ,0 i j i jd v ,≤ ≤ ) [fraction of flow defended] 
Defense 
Cost Total cost per quarter to defend that particular pipeline segment. 
[CY$2007M] 
Pipeline 
Length Total length of the indicated pipeline segment. [U.S. statute miles] 
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 77
APPENDIX E.  DISTRIBUTION OF “BASELINE ATTACKS” 
This appendix summarizes the distribution of attacks by quarter against all 
possible Iraqi pipeline segments (ij).  Pipelines are identified by their GAMS ID’s 
(Appendix A).  The arc total column indicates the sum total of attacks against a particular 
pipeline over the entire 40-quarter planning horizon and can not be larger than the 
parameter epoch_attacks.  The attack total row indicates the total number of attacks 
carried out during the indicated quarter.  This value cannot exceed the parameter 
atks_by_q.  The grand total of either of these totals the number of attacks over the entire 
planning horizon and cannot exceed the parameter mx_atks. 








Construction factor 1.0 
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 81
APPENDIX F.  DISTRIBUTION OF “BIG ATTACKS”  
This appendix summarizes the distribution of attacks by quarter against all 
possible Iraqi pipeline segments (ij).  All field descriptions are similar to those discussed 
in Appendix E. 
The Big Attacks scenario has the following settings: 
 






Construction factor 1.0 
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 85
APPENDIX G.  DISTRIBUTION OF “REALLY BIG ATTACKS” 
This appendix summarizes the distribution of attacks by quarter against all 
possible Iraqi pipeline segments (ij).  All field descriptions are similar to those discussed 
in Appendix E. 










Construction factor 1.0 
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APPENDIX H.  QUARTERLY FLOW RESULTS  
 89
qtr Baseline Big Attk Really Big Attk Constr Cost + Def. Cost +
q01 238,500           238,500           238,500           238,500           238,500           
q02 355,500           270,000           355,500           355,500           355,500           
q03 207,000           355,500           355,500           373,500           355,500           
q04 427,500           427,500           355,500           396,000           427,500           
q05 427,500           427,500           405,000           427,500           427,500           
q06 427,500           427,500           427,500           450,000           168,750           
q07 499,500           499,500           427,500           450,000           499,500           
q08 499,500           499,500           427,500           198,000           499,500           
q09 499,500           499,500           427,500           450,000           499,500           
q10 499,500           499,500           416,250           450,000           499,500           
q11 499,500           499,500           414,000           450,000           499,500           
q12 499,500           499,500           522,000           522,000           355,500           
q13 607,500           499,500           522,000           522,000           652,500           
q14 652,500           499,500           522,000           522,000           652,500           
q15 643,500           652,500           666,000           666,000           652,500           
q16 652,500           654,750           666,000           666,000           654,750           
q17 607,500           654,750           666,000           666,000           654,750           
q18 654,750           666,000           666,000           666,000           654,750           
q19 695,250           666,000           675,000           666,000           675,000           
q20 652,500           666,000           675,000           666,000           663,750           
q21 650,250           666,000           675,000           697,500           551,250           
q22 663,750           666,000           675,000           697,500           695,250           
q23 663,750           666,000           675,000           697,500           684,000           
q24 695,250           697,500           675,000           697,500           695,250           
q25 695,250           697,500           675,000           675,000           695,250           
q26 695,250           697,500           675,000           697,500           695,250           
q27 695,250           697,500           675,000           553,500           695,250           
q28 663,750           697,500           675,000           697,500           540,000           
q29 695,250           697,500           675,000           697,500           695,250           
q30 562,500           697,500           675,000           697,500           695,250           
q31 695,250           697,500           675,000           675,000           695,250           
q32 695,250           697,500           675,000           697,500           695,250           
q33 695,250           697,500           675,000           697,500           663,750           
q34 684,000           697,500           675,000           697,500           695,250           
q35 695,250           697,500           675,000           697,500           393,750           
q36 695,250           697,500           675,000           697,500           695,250           
q37 695,250           697,500           675,000           697,500           695,250           
q38 695,250           697,500           675,000           684,000           540,000           
q39 684,000           697,500           567,000           697,500           695,250           
q40 695,250           697,500           675,000           697,500           695,250           
total (kbbl) 23,856,750      23,958,000      23,222,250      23,548,500      23,193,000      
kbbd (ave) 6,627               6,655               6,451               6,541               6,443               
Export Potential 
($Million) 1,192,837.50   1,197,900.00   1,161,112.50   1,177,425.00   1,159,650.00   
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APPENDIX I.  BASELINE BUILD SCHEDULE 
CONSTRUCTION ACTIVITIES AND SPENDING SCHEDULE SHOWING FLOW CAPACITIES AND UNATTACKED 
FLOWS ON PROJECT ARCS, AND TOTAL EXPORTS...  (iteration    1) 
 
(only arcs being expanded are shown; a star denotes one with flow at legacy capacity) 
 
qtr         fm  to  d           cost     legacy     expanded  unattacked      export 
                                        capacity    capacity        flow        flow 
q01 
    start:  n31 n61 d01        25.82   126000.00                63000.00 
    start:  n39 n54 d01        40.26    72000.00                72000.00* 
    start:  n41 n30 d01         3.03   135000.00               135000.00* 
    start:  n41 n62 d01        44.48    31500.00                31500.00* 
    finish: n31 n61             0.00   126000.00   252000.00    63000.00 
    finish: n39 n54             0.00    72000.00   144000.00    72000.00* 
    finish: n41 n30             0.00   135000.00   270000.00   135000.00* 
    finish: n41 n62             0.00    31500.00    63000.00    31500.00* 
                                                                           238500.00 
q02 
    start:  n02 n40 d01       144.62   227250.00               227250.00* 
    start:  n12 n36 d01         9.46    11250.00                11250.00* 
    finish: n02 n40             0.00   227250.00   454500.00   227250.00* 
    finish: n12 n36             0.00    11250.00    22500.00    11250.00* 
                                                                           355500.00 
q03 
    start:  n27 n23 d01        32.85    49500.00                49500.00* 
    start:  n41 n59 d01        74.81        0.00                    0.00* 
    start:  n49 n13 d01        11.11    31500.00                    0.00 
    finish: n27 n23             0.00    49500.00    99000.00    49500.00* 
    finish: n41 n59             0.00        0.00    22500.00        0.00* 
    finish: n49 n13             0.00    31500.00    63000.00        0.00 
                                                                           405000.00 
q04 
    start:  n06 n21 d01        84.54    72000.00                60750.00 
    finish: n06 n21             0.00    72000.00   144000.00    60750.00 
                                                                           427500.00 
q05 
    start:  n25 n23 d01        25.11    22500.00                    0.00 
    start:  n35 n32 d02        63.68    72000.00                72000.00* 
    finish: n25 n23             0.00    22500.00    45000.00        0.00 
                                                                           427500.00 
q06 
    start:  n12 n34 d01         7.36    72000.00                72000.00* 
    start:  n22 n11 d01         9.74    72000.00                60750.00 
    start:  n24 n38 d01        75.80    72000.00                72000.00* 
    start:  n27 n25 d01        24.51    22500.00                22500.00* 
    start:  n31 n60 d01        27.17    72000.00                18000.00 
    start:  n33 n26 d01        24.71    72000.00                72000.00* 
    finish: n12 n34             0.00    72000.00   144000.00    72000.00* 
    finish: n22 n11             0.00    72000.00   144000.00    60750.00 
    finish: n24 n38             0.00    72000.00   144000.00    72000.00* 
    finish: n27 n25             0.00    22500.00    45000.00    22500.00* 
    finish: n31 n60             0.00    72000.00   144000.00    18000.00 
    finish: n33 n26             0.00    72000.00   144000.00    72000.00* 
    finish: n35 n32            63.68    72000.00   144000.00    72000.00* 
                                                                           427500.00 
q09 
    start:  n51 n56 d01       180.05        0.00                    0.00* 
    finish: n51 n56             0.00        0.00   153000.00        0.00* 
                                                                           499500.00 
q11 
    start:  n41 n50 d02       314.98        0.00                    0.00* 
                                                                           499500.00 
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q12 
    finish: n41 n50           314.98        0.00   153000.00        0.00* 
                                                                           499500.00 
q13 
    start:  n53 n57 d01        43.94        0.00                    0.00* 
    finish: n53 n57             0.00        0.00    22500.00        0.00* 
                                                                           652500.00 
q15 
    start:  n53 n58 d03        75.31        0.00                    0.00* 
                                                                           652500.00 
q16 
    start:  n43 n52 d02        45.96        0.00                    0.00* 
    build:  n53 n58            75.31        0.00                    0.00* 
                                                                           652500.00 
q17 
    start:  n09 n40 d02       203.22    45000.00                45000.00* 
    finish: n43 n52            45.96        0.00    45000.00        0.00* 
    finish: n53 n58            75.31        0.00    22500.00        0.00* 
                                                                           652500.00 
q18 
    start:  n16 n11 d03        20.99    11250.00                11250.00* 
    finish: n09 n40           203.22    45000.00    90000.00    45000.00* 
                                                                           654750.00 
q19 
    start:  n41 n17 d01       105.64    31500.00                31500.00* 
    build:  n16 n11            20.99    11250.00                11250.00* 
    finish: n41 n17             0.00    31500.00    63000.00    31500.00* 
                                                                           695250.00 
q20 
    finish: n16 n11            20.99    11250.00    22500.00    11250.00* 
                                                                           695250.00 
q24 
    start:  n45 n42 d01        77.56    31500.00                31500.00* 
    finish: n45 n42             0.00    31500.00    63000.00    31500.00* 
                                                                           695250.00 
q26 
    start:  n49 n17 d01        33.38    31500.00                    0.00 
    finish: n49 n17             0.00    31500.00    63000.00        0.00 
                                                                           695250.00 
q27 
    start:  n04 n40 d04       185.78        0.00                    0.00* 
                                                                           695250.00 
q28 
    start:  n06 n03 d02       252.54        0.00                    0.00* 
    start:  n18 n48 d01        33.38    31500.00                31500.00* 
    build:  n04 n40           185.78        0.00                    0.00* 
    finish: n18 n48             0.00    31500.00    63000.00    31500.00* 
                                                                           695250.00 
q29 
    build:  n04 n40           185.78        0.00                    0.00* 
    finish: n06 n03           252.54        0.00    63000.00        0.00* 
                                                                           695250.00 
q30 
    finish: n04 n40           185.78        0.00    63000.00        0.00* 
                                                                           695250.00 
q31 
    start:  n08 n05 d01         7.34    11250.00                    0.00 
    start:  n10 n19 d01         9.96    11250.00                11250.00* 
    start:  n14 n48 d01        11.11    31500.00                    0.00 
    finish: n08 n05             0.00    11250.00    22500.00        0.00 
    finish: n10 n19             0.00    11250.00    22500.00    11250.00* 
    finish: n14 n48             0.00    31500.00    63000.00        0.00 
                                                                           695250.00 
q32 
    start:  n07 n05 d01         6.54     2250.00                 2250.00* 
    start:  n29 n15 d01         4.97    22500.00                22500.00* 
    finish: n07 n05             0.00     2250.00     4500.00     2250.00* 
    finish: n29 n15             0.00    22500.00    45000.00    22500.00* 
                                                                           695250.00 
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q33 
    start:  n18 n40 d02        44.02    31500.00                    0.00 
                                                                           695250.00 
q34 
    finish: n18 n40            44.02    31500.00    63000.00        0.00 
                                                                           695250.00 
q38 
    start:  n04 n28 d01         7.95    22500.00                22500.00* 
    start:  n31 n55 d01         8.05        0.00                    0.00* 
    finish: n04 n28             0.00    22500.00    45000.00    22500.00* 
    finish: n31 n55             0.00        0.00    18000.00        0.00* 
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APPENDIX J.  BIG ATTACKS BUILD SCHEDULE
CONSTRUCTION ACTIVITIES AND SPENDING SCHEDULE SHOWING FLOW CAPACITIES AND UNATTACKED 
FLOWS ON PROJECT ARCS, AND TOTAL EXPORTS...  (iteration    1) 
 
(only arcs being expanded are shown; a star denotes one with flow at legacy capacity) 
 
qtr         fm  to  d           cost     legacy     expanded  unattacked      export 
                                        capacity    capacity        flow        flow 
q01 
    start:  n31 n61 d01        25.82   126000.00                63000.00 
    start:  n39 n54 d01        40.26    72000.00                72000.00* 
    start:  n41 n30 d01         3.03   135000.00               135000.00* 
    start:  n41 n62 d01        44.48    31500.00                31500.00* 
    finish: n31 n61             0.00   126000.00   252000.00    63000.00 
    finish: n39 n54             0.00    72000.00   144000.00    72000.00* 
    finish: n41 n30             0.00   135000.00   270000.00   135000.00* 
    finish: n41 n62             0.00    31500.00    63000.00    31500.00* 
                                                                           238500.00 
q02 
    start:  n02 n40 d01       144.62   227250.00               227250.00* 
    start:  n12 n36 d01         9.46    11250.00                11250.00* 
    finish: n02 n40             0.00   227250.00   454500.00   227250.00* 
    finish: n12 n36             0.00    11250.00    22500.00    11250.00* 
                                                                           355500.00 
q03 
    start:  n27 n23 d01        32.85    49500.00                49500.00* 
    start:  n41 n59 d01        74.81        0.00                    0.00* 
    start:  n49 n13 d01        11.11    31500.00                    0.00 
    finish: n27 n23             0.00    49500.00    99000.00    49500.00* 
    finish: n41 n59             0.00        0.00    22500.00        0.00* 
    finish: n49 n13             0.00    31500.00    63000.00        0.00 
                                                                           405000.00 
q04 
    start:  n06 n21 d01        84.54    72000.00                60750.00 
    finish: n06 n21             0.00    72000.00   144000.00    60750.00 
                                                                           427500.00 
q05 
    start:  n25 n23 d01        25.11    22500.00                    0.00 
    start:  n35 n32 d02        63.68    72000.00                72000.00* 
    finish: n25 n23             0.00    22500.00    45000.00        0.00 
                                                                           427500.00 
q06 
    start:  n12 n34 d01         7.36    72000.00                72000.00* 
    start:  n22 n11 d01         9.74    72000.00                60750.00 
    start:  n24 n38 d01        75.80    72000.00                72000.00* 
    start:  n27 n25 d01        24.51    22500.00                22500.00* 
    start:  n31 n60 d01        27.17    72000.00                18000.00 
    start:  n33 n26 d01        24.71    72000.00                72000.00* 
    finish: n12 n34             0.00    72000.00   144000.00    72000.00* 
    finish: n22 n11             0.00    72000.00   144000.00    60750.00 
    finish: n24 n38             0.00    72000.00   144000.00    72000.00* 
    finish: n27 n25             0.00    22500.00    45000.00    22500.00* 
    finish: n31 n60             0.00    72000.00   144000.00    18000.00 
    finish: n33 n26             0.00    72000.00   144000.00    72000.00* 
    finish: n35 n32            63.68    72000.00   144000.00    72000.00* 
                                                                           427500.00 
q09 
    start:  n51 n56 d01       180.05        0.00                    0.00* 
    finish: n51 n56             0.00        0.00   153000.00        0.00* 
                                                                           499500.00 
q11 
    start:  n41 n50 d02       314.98        0.00                    0.00* 
                                                                           499500.00 
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q12 
    finish: n41 n50           314.98        0.00   153000.00        0.00* 
                                                                           499500.00 
q13 
    start:  n53 n57 d01        43.94        0.00                    0.00* 
    finish: n53 n57             0.00        0.00    22500.00        0.00* 
                                                                           652500.00 
q15 
    start:  n53 n58 d03        75.31        0.00                    0.00* 
                                                                           652500.00 
q16 
    start:  n43 n52 d02        45.96        0.00                    0.00* 
    build:  n53 n58            75.31        0.00                    0.00* 
                                                                           652500.00 
q17 
    start:  n09 n40 d02       203.22    45000.00                45000.00* 
    finish: n43 n52            45.96        0.00    45000.00        0.00* 
    finish: n53 n58            75.31        0.00    22500.00        0.00* 
                                                                           652500.00 
q18 
    start:  n16 n11 d03        20.99    11250.00                11250.00* 
    finish: n09 n40           203.22    45000.00    90000.00    45000.00* 
                                                                           654750.00 
q19 
    start:  n41 n17 d01       105.64    31500.00                31500.00* 
    build:  n16 n11            20.99    11250.00                11250.00* 
    finish: n41 n17             0.00    31500.00    63000.00    31500.00* 
                                                                           695250.00 
q20 
    finish: n16 n11            20.99    11250.00    22500.00    11250.00* 
                                                                           695250.00 
q24 
    start:  n45 n42 d01        77.56    31500.00                31500.00* 
    finish: n45 n42             0.00    31500.00    63000.00    31500.00* 
                                                                           695250.00 
q26 
    start:  n49 n17 d01        33.38    31500.00                    0.00 
    finish: n49 n17             0.00    31500.00    63000.00        0.00 
                                                                           695250.00 
q27 
    start:  n04 n40 d04       185.78        0.00                    0.00* 
                                                                           695250.00 
q28 
    start:  n06 n03 d02       252.54        0.00                    0.00* 
    start:  n18 n48 d01        33.38    31500.00                31500.00* 
    build:  n04 n40           185.78        0.00                    0.00* 
    finish: n18 n48             0.00    31500.00    63000.00    31500.00* 
                                                                           695250.00 
q29 
    build:  n04 n40           185.78        0.00                    0.00* 
    finish: n06 n03           252.54        0.00    63000.00        0.00* 
                                                                           695250.00 
q30 
    finish: n04 n40           185.78        0.00    63000.00        0.00* 
                                                                           695250.00 
q31 
    start:  n08 n05 d01         7.34    11250.00                    0.00 
    start:  n10 n19 d01         9.96    11250.00                11250.00* 
    start:  n14 n48 d01        11.11    31500.00                    0.00 
    finish: n08 n05             0.00    11250.00    22500.00        0.00 
    finish: n10 n19             0.00    11250.00    22500.00    11250.00* 
    finish: n14 n48             0.00    31500.00    63000.00        0.00 
                                                                           695250.00 
q32 
    start:  n07 n05 d01         6.54     2250.00                 2250.00* 
    start:  n29 n15 d01         4.97    22500.00                22500.00* 
    finish: n07 n05             0.00     2250.00     4500.00     2250.00* 
    finish: n29 n15             0.00    22500.00    45000.00    22500.00* 
                                                                           695250.00 
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q33 
    start:  n18 n40 d02        44.02    31500.00                    0.00 
                                                                           695250.00 
q34 
    finish: n18 n40            44.02    31500.00    63000.00        0.00 
                                                                           695250.00 
q38 
    start:  n04 n28 d01         7.95    22500.00                22500.00* 
    start:  n31 n55 d01         8.05        0.00                    0.00* 
    finish: n04 n28             0.00    22500.00    45000.00    22500.00* 
    finish: n31 n55             0.00        0.00    18000.00        0.00* 
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APPENDIX K.  REALLY BIG ATTACKS BUILD SCHEDULE 
CONSTRUCTION ACTIVITIES AND SPENDING SCHEDULE SHOWING FLOW CAPACITIES AND UNATTACKED 
FLOWS ON PROJECT ARCS, AND TOTAL EXPORTS...  (iteration    1) 
 
(only arcs being expanded are shown; a star denotes one with flow at legacy capacity) 
 
qtr         fm  to  d           cost     legacy     expanded  unattacked      export 
                                        capacity    capacity        flow        flow 
q01 
    start:  n31 n61 d01        25.82   126000.00                63000.00 
    start:  n39 n54 d01        40.26    72000.00                72000.00* 
    start:  n41 n30 d01         3.03   135000.00               135000.00* 
    start:  n41 n62 d01        44.48    31500.00                31500.00* 
    finish: n31 n61             0.00   126000.00   252000.00    63000.00 
    finish: n39 n54             0.00    72000.00   144000.00    72000.00* 
    finish: n41 n30             0.00   135000.00   270000.00   135000.00* 
    finish: n41 n62             0.00    31500.00    63000.00    31500.00* 
                                                                           238500.00 
q02 
    start:  n02 n40 d01       144.62   227250.00               227250.00* 
    start:  n12 n36 d01         9.46    11250.00                11250.00* 
    finish: n02 n40             0.00   227250.00   454500.00   227250.00* 
    finish: n12 n36             0.00    11250.00    22500.00    11250.00* 
                                                                           355500.00 
q03 
    start:  n27 n23 d01        32.85    49500.00                49500.00* 
    start:  n41 n59 d01        74.81        0.00                    0.00* 
    start:  n49 n13 d01        11.11    31500.00                    0.00 
    finish: n27 n23             0.00    49500.00    99000.00    49500.00* 
    finish: n41 n59             0.00        0.00    22500.00        0.00* 
    finish: n49 n13             0.00    31500.00    63000.00        0.00 
                                                                           405000.00 
q04 
    start:  n06 n21 d01        84.54    72000.00                60750.00 
    finish: n06 n21             0.00    72000.00   144000.00    60750.00 
                                                                           427500.00 
q05 
    start:  n25 n23 d01        25.11    22500.00                    0.00 
    start:  n35 n32 d02        63.68    72000.00                72000.00* 
    finish: n25 n23             0.00    22500.00    45000.00        0.00 
                                                                           427500.00 
q06 
    start:  n12 n34 d01         7.36    72000.00                72000.00* 
    start:  n22 n11 d01         9.74    72000.00                60750.00 
    start:  n24 n38 d01        75.80    72000.00                72000.00* 
    start:  n27 n25 d01        24.51    22500.00                22500.00* 
    start:  n31 n60 d01        27.17    72000.00                18000.00 
    start:  n33 n26 d01        24.71    72000.00                72000.00* 
    finish: n12 n34             0.00    72000.00   144000.00    72000.00* 
    finish: n22 n11             0.00    72000.00   144000.00    60750.00 
    finish: n24 n38             0.00    72000.00   144000.00    72000.00* 
    finish: n27 n25             0.00    22500.00    45000.00    22500.00* 
    finish: n31 n60             0.00    72000.00   144000.00    18000.00 
    finish: n33 n26             0.00    72000.00   144000.00    72000.00* 
    finish: n35 n32            63.68    72000.00   144000.00    72000.00* 
                                                                           427500.00 
q09 
    start:  n51 n56 d01       180.05        0.00                    0.00* 
    finish: n51 n56             0.00        0.00   153000.00        0.00* 
                                                                           499500.00 
q11 
    start:  n41 n50 d02       314.98        0.00                    0.00* 
                                                                           499500.00 
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q12 
    finish: n41 n50           314.98        0.00   153000.00        0.00* 
                                                                           499500.00 
q13 
    start:  n53 n57 d01        43.94        0.00                    0.00* 
    finish: n53 n57             0.00        0.00    22500.00        0.00* 
                                                                           652500.00 
q15 
    start:  n53 n58 d03        75.31        0.00                    0.00* 
                                                                           652500.00 
q16 
    start:  n43 n52 d02        45.96        0.00                    0.00* 
    build:  n53 n58            75.31        0.00                    0.00* 
                                                                           652500.00 
q17 
    start:  n09 n40 d02       203.22    45000.00                45000.00* 
    finish: n43 n52            45.96        0.00    45000.00        0.00* 
    finish: n53 n58            75.31        0.00    22500.00        0.00* 
                                                                           652500.00 
q18 
    start:  n16 n11 d03        20.99    11250.00                11250.00* 
    finish: n09 n40           203.22    45000.00    90000.00    45000.00* 
                                                                           654750.00 
q19 
    start:  n41 n17 d01       105.64    31500.00                31500.00* 
    build:  n16 n11            20.99    11250.00                11250.00* 
    finish: n41 n17             0.00    31500.00    63000.00    31500.00* 
                                                                           695250.00 
q20 
    finish: n16 n11            20.99    11250.00    22500.00    11250.00* 
                                                                           695250.00 
q24 
    start:  n45 n42 d01        77.56    31500.00                31500.00* 
    finish: n45 n42             0.00    31500.00    63000.00    31500.00* 
                                                                           695250.00 
q26 
    start:  n49 n17 d01        33.38    31500.00                    0.00 
    finish: n49 n17             0.00    31500.00    63000.00        0.00 
                                                                           695250.00 
q27 
    start:  n04 n40 d04       185.78        0.00                    0.00* 
                                                                           695250.00 
q28 
    start:  n06 n03 d02       252.54        0.00                    0.00* 
    start:  n18 n48 d01        33.38    31500.00                31500.00* 
    build:  n04 n40           185.78        0.00                    0.00* 
    finish: n18 n48             0.00    31500.00    63000.00    31500.00* 
                                                                           695250.00 
q29 
    build:  n04 n40           185.78        0.00                    0.00* 
    finish: n06 n03           252.54        0.00    63000.00        0.00* 
                                                                           695250.00 
q30 
    finish: n04 n40           185.78        0.00    63000.00        0.00* 
                                                                           695250.00 
q31 
    start:  n08 n05 d01         7.34    11250.00                    0.00 
    start:  n10 n19 d01         9.96    11250.00                11250.00* 
    start:  n14 n48 d01        11.11    31500.00                    0.00 
    finish: n08 n05             0.00    11250.00    22500.00        0.00 
    finish: n10 n19             0.00    11250.00    22500.00    11250.00* 
    finish: n14 n48             0.00    31500.00    63000.00        0.00 
                                                                           695250.00 
q32 
    start:  n07 n05 d01         6.54     2250.00                 2250.00* 
    start:  n29 n15 d01         4.97    22500.00                22500.00* 
    finish: n07 n05             0.00     2250.00     4500.00     2250.00* 
    finish: n29 n15             0.00    22500.00    45000.00    22500.00* 
                                                                           695250.00 
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q33 
    start:  n18 n40 d02        44.02    31500.00                    0.00 
                                                                           695250.00 
q34 
    finish: n18 n40            44.02    31500.00    63000.00        0.00 
                                                                           695250.00 
q38 
    start:  n04 n28 d01         7.95    22500.00                22500.00* 
    start:  n31 n55 d01         8.05        0.00                    0.00* 
    finish: n04 n28             0.00    22500.00    45000.00    22500.00* 
    finish: n31 n55             0.00        0.00    18000.00        0.00* 
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APPENDIX L.  CONSTRUCTION COST PLUS BUILD SCHEDULE 
CONSTRUCTION ACTIVITIES AND SPENDING SCHEDULE SHOWING FLOW CAPACITIES AND UNATTACKED 
FLOWS ON PROJECT ARCS, AND TOTAL EXPORTS...  (iteration    1) 
 
(only arcs being expanded are shown; a star denotes one with flow at legacy capacity) 
 
qtr         fm  to  d           cost     legacy     expanded  unattacked      export 
                                        capacity    capacity        flow        flow 
q01 
    start:  n27 n23 d01        49.27    49500.00                49500.00* 
    start:  n35 n32 d02        95.52    72000.00                72000.00* 
    start:  n37 n42 d02        34.58    11250.00                11250.00* 
    start:  n41 n30 d01         4.54   135000.00               135000.00* 
    finish: n27 n23             0.00    49500.00    99000.00    49500.00* 
    finish: n41 n30             0.00   135000.00   270000.00   135000.00* 
                                                                           238500.00 
q02 
    start:  n12 n34 d01        11.04    72000.00                72000.00* 
    start:  n31 n55 d01        12.08        0.00                    0.00* 
    start:  n49 n13 d01        16.67    31500.00                    0.00 
    finish: n12 n34             0.00    72000.00   144000.00    72000.00* 
    finish: n31 n55             0.00        0.00    18000.00        0.00* 
    finish: n35 n32            95.52    72000.00   144000.00    72000.00* 
    finish: n37 n42            34.58    11250.00    22500.00    11250.00* 
    finish: n49 n13             0.00    31500.00    63000.00        0.00 
                                                                           301500.00 
q03 
    start:  n06 n21 d01       126.81    72000.00                72000.00* 
    start:  n39 n54 d01        60.40    72000.00                72000.00* 
    finish: n06 n21             0.00    72000.00   144000.00    72000.00* 
    finish: n39 n54             0.00    72000.00   144000.00    72000.00* 
                                                                           319500.00 
q04 
    start:  n12 n36 d01        14.19    11250.00                    0.00 
    start:  n16 n11 d03        31.49    11250.00                11250.00* 
    start:  n22 n11 d01        14.61    72000.00                60750.00 
    start:  n24 n38 d01       113.69    72000.00                72000.00* 
    start:  n33 n26 d01        37.06    72000.00                72000.00* 
    finish: n12 n36             0.00    11250.00    22500.00        0.00 
    finish: n22 n11             0.00    72000.00   144000.00    60750.00 
    finish: n24 n38             0.00    72000.00   144000.00    72000.00* 
    finish: n33 n26             0.00    72000.00   144000.00    72000.00* 
                                                                           319500.00 
q05 
    start:  n41 n59 d01       112.21        0.00                    0.00* 
    start:  n41 n62 d01        66.72    31500.00                31500.00* 
    build:  n16 n11            31.49    11250.00                    0.00 
    finish: n41 n59             0.00        0.00    22500.00        0.00* 
    finish: n41 n62             0.00    31500.00    63000.00    31500.00* 
                                                                           369000.00 
q06 
    start:  n25 n23 d01        37.66    22500.00                22500.00* 
    start:  n27 n25 d01        36.76    22500.00                22500.00* 
    start:  n31 n60 d01        40.75    72000.00                72000.00* 
    start:  n53 n57 d01        65.92        0.00                    0.00* 
    finish: n16 n11            31.49    11250.00    22500.00    11250.00* 
    finish: n25 n23             0.00    22500.00    45000.00    22500.00* 
    finish: n27 n25             0.00    22500.00    45000.00    22500.00* 
    finish: n31 n60             0.00    72000.00   144000.00    72000.00* 
    finish: n53 n57             0.00        0.00    22500.00        0.00* 
                                                                           416250.00 
q07 
    start:  n31 n61 d01        38.72   126000.00               126000.00* 
    finish: n31 n61             0.00   126000.00   252000.00   126000.00* 
                                                                           438750.00 
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q08 
    start:  n04 n28 d01        11.93    22500.00                22500.00* 
    start:  n07 n05 d01         9.81     2250.00                 2250.00* 
    start:  n29 n15 d01         7.46    22500.00                22500.00* 
    start:  n51 n56 d01       270.07        0.00                    0.00* 
    finish: n04 n28             0.00    22500.00    45000.00    22500.00* 
    finish: n07 n05             0.00     2250.00     4500.00     2250.00* 
    finish: n29 n15             0.00    22500.00    45000.00    22500.00* 
    finish: n51 n56             0.00        0.00   153000.00        0.00* 
                                                                           438750.00 
q10 
    start:  n43 n52 d01       165.45        0.00                    0.00* 
    finish: n43 n52             0.00        0.00    45000.00        0.00* 
                                                                           438750.00 
q11 
    start:  n02 n40 d01       216.93   227250.00               227250.00* 
    start:  n53 n58 d02       203.34        0.00                    0.00* 
    finish: n02 n40             0.00   227250.00   454500.00   227250.00* 
                                                                           438750.00 
q12 
    finish: n53 n58           203.34        0.00    22500.00        0.00* 
                                                                           522000.00 
q13 
    start:  n47 n44 d02        52.73    31500.00                22500.00 
                                                                           544500.00 
q14 
    start:  n18 n40 d01       158.46    31500.00                    0.00 
    finish: n18 n40             0.00    31500.00    63000.00        0.00 
    finish: n47 n44            52.73    31500.00    63000.00    22500.00 
                                                                           544500.00 
q15 
    start:  n14 n46 d01        82.48    31500.00                22500.00 
    finish: n14 n46             0.00    31500.00    63000.00    22500.00 
                                                                           544500.00 
q18 
    start:  n41 n50 d02       472.47        0.00                    0.00* 
                                                                           544500.00 
q19 
    finish: n41 n50           472.47        0.00   153000.00        0.00* 
                                                                           544500.00 
q21 
    start:  n09 n40 d02       304.83    45000.00                45000.00* 
                                                                           666000.00 
q22 
    finish: n09 n40           304.83    45000.00    90000.00    45000.00* 
                                                                           666000.00 
q26 
    start:  n18 n48 d01        50.07    31500.00                22500.00 
    start:  n49 n17 d01        50.07    31500.00                    0.00 
    finish: n18 n48             0.00    31500.00    63000.00    22500.00 
    finish: n49 n17             0.00    31500.00    63000.00        0.00 
                                                                           697500.00 
q27 
    start:  n04 n40 d03       445.87        0.00                    0.00* 
                                                                           697500.00 
q28 
    build:  n04 n40           445.87        0.00                    0.00* 
                                                                           697500.00 
q29 
    finish: n04 n40           445.87        0.00    63000.00        0.00* 
                                                                           697500.00 
q30 
    start:  n20 n03 d01        74.53    11250.00                    0.00 
    finish: n20 n03             0.00    11250.00    22500.00        0.00 
                                                                           697500.00 
q33 
    start:  n12 n15 d02        56.68    11250.00                    0.00 
    start:  n45 n42 d02        48.48    31500.00                22500.00 
                                                                           697500.00 
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q34 
    start:  n10 n19 d01        14.94    11250.00                11250.00* 
    start:  n41 n02 d01        88.97    31500.00                    0.00 
    start:  n47 n13 d02        34.37    31500.00                    0.00 
    finish: n10 n19             0.00    11250.00    22500.00    11250.00* 
    finish: n12 n15            56.68    11250.00    22500.00        0.00 
    finish: n41 n02             0.00    31500.00    63000.00        0.00 
    finish: n45 n42            48.48    31500.00    63000.00    22500.00 
                                                                           697500.00 
q35 
    start:  n08 n05 d01        11.01    11250.00                    0.00 
    start:  n14 n48 d01        16.67    31500.00                    0.00 
    finish: n08 n05             0.00    11250.00    22500.00        0.00 
    finish: n14 n48             0.00    31500.00    63000.00        0.00 
    finish: n47 n13            34.37    31500.00    63000.00        0.00 
                                                                           697500.00 
q37 
    start:  n43 n44 d01       116.34    31500.00                    0.00 
    finish: n43 n44             0.00    31500.00    63000.00        0.00 
                                                                           697500.00 
q38 
    start:  n41 n17 d01       158.46    31500.00                31500.00* 
    finish: n41 n17             0.00    31500.00    63000.00    31500.00* 
                                                                           697500.00 
q39 
    start:  n45 n46 d01       126.56    31500.00                    0.00 
    finish: n45 n46             0.00    31500.00    63000.00        0.00 
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APPENDIX M.  DEFENSE COST PLUS BUILD SCHEDULE 
CONSTRUCTION ACTIVITIES AND SPENDING SCHEDULE SHOWING FLOW CAPACITIES AND UNATTACKED 
FLOWS ON PROJECT ARCS, AND TOTAL EXPORTS...  (iteration    1) 
 
(only arcs being expanded are shown; a star denotes one with flow at legacy capacity) 
 
qtr         fm  to  d           cost     legacy     expanded  unattacked      export 
                                        capacity    capacity        flow        flow 
q01 
    start:  n04 n28 d01         7.95    22500.00                11250.00 
    start:  n31 n55 d01         8.05        0.00                    0.00* 
    start:  n41 n30 d01         3.03   135000.00               135000.00* 
    start:  n41 n59 d01        74.81        0.00                    0.00* 
    finish: n04 n28             0.00    22500.00    45000.00    11250.00 
    finish: n31 n55             0.00        0.00    18000.00        0.00* 
    finish: n41 n30             0.00   135000.00   270000.00   135000.00* 
    finish: n41 n59             0.00        0.00    22500.00        0.00* 
                                                                           238500.00 
q02 
    start:  n02 n40 d01       144.62   227250.00               227250.00* 
    start:  n31 n60 d01        27.17    72000.00                72000.00* 
    finish: n02 n40             0.00   227250.00   454500.00   227250.00* 
    finish: n31 n60             0.00    72000.00   144000.00    72000.00* 
                                                                           342000.00 
q03 
    start:  n12 n34 d01         7.36    72000.00                72000.00* 
    start:  n35 n32 d02        63.68    72000.00                72000.00* 
    start:  n41 n62 d01        44.48    31500.00                31500.00* 
    finish: n12 n34             0.00    72000.00   144000.00    72000.00* 
    finish: n41 n62             0.00    31500.00    63000.00    31500.00* 
                                                                           396000.00 
q04 
    start:  n27 n23 d01        32.85    49500.00                49500.00* 
    start:  n53 n57 d01        43.94        0.00                    0.00* 
    finish: n27 n23             0.00    49500.00    99000.00    49500.00* 
    finish: n35 n32            63.68    72000.00   144000.00    72000.00* 
    finish: n53 n57             0.00        0.00    22500.00        0.00* 
                                                                           427500.00 
q05 
    start:  n43 n52 d01       110.30        0.00                    0.00* 
    finish: n43 n52             0.00        0.00    45000.00        0.00* 
                                                                           427500.00 
q06 
    start:  n27 n25 d01        24.51    22500.00                    0.00 
    finish: n27 n25             0.00    22500.00    45000.00        0.00 
                                                                           450000.00 
q07 
    start:  n22 n11 d01         9.74    72000.00                72000.00* 
    start:  n37 n42 d01        55.33    11250.00                11250.00* 
    finish: n22 n11             0.00    72000.00   144000.00    72000.00* 
    finish: n37 n42             0.00    11250.00    22500.00    11250.00* 
                                                                           450000.00 
q08 
    start:  n06 n21 d01        84.54    72000.00                72000.00* 
    finish: n06 n21             0.00    72000.00   144000.00    72000.00* 
                                                                           450000.00 
q09 
    start:  n33 n26 d01        24.71    72000.00                72000.00* 
    finish: n33 n26             0.00    72000.00   144000.00    72000.00* 
                                                                           450000.00 
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q10 
    start:  n24 n38 d01        75.80    72000.00                72000.00* 
    start:  n25 n23 d01        25.11    22500.00                22500.00* 
    start:  n39 n54 d01        40.26    72000.00                72000.00* 
    finish: n24 n38             0.00    72000.00   144000.00    72000.00* 
    finish: n25 n23             0.00    22500.00    45000.00    22500.00* 
    finish: n39 n54             0.00    72000.00   144000.00    72000.00* 
                                                                           450000.00 
q11 
    start:  n45 n46 d02        35.16    31500.00                    0.00 
                                                                           522000.00 
q12 
    finish: n45 n46            35.16    31500.00    63000.00        0.00 
                                                                           522000.00 
q13 
    start:  n41 n50 d02       314.98        0.00                    0.00* 
    start:  n51 n56 d01       180.05        0.00                    0.00* 
    finish: n51 n56             0.00        0.00   153000.00        0.00* 
                                                                           522000.00 
q14 
    finish: n41 n50           314.98        0.00   153000.00        0.00* 
                                                                           522000.00 
q15 
    start:  n16 n11 d02        37.79    11250.00                11250.00* 
                                                                           654750.00 
q16 
    start:  n12 n36 d01         9.46    11250.00                11250.00* 
    finish: n12 n36             0.00    11250.00    22500.00    11250.00* 
    finish: n16 n11            37.79    11250.00    22500.00    11250.00* 
                                                                           654750.00 
q17 
    start:  n09 n40 d02       203.22    45000.00                45000.00* 
                                                                           666000.00 
q18 
    finish: n09 n40           203.22    45000.00    90000.00    45000.00* 
                                                                           666000.00 
q20 
    start:  n14 n46 d02        22.91    31500.00                    0.00 
                                                                           675000.00 
q21 
    start:  n31 n61 d01        25.82   126000.00               126000.00* 
    start:  n41 n17 d02        44.02    31500.00                    0.00 
    start:  n45 n42 d02        32.32    31500.00                    0.00 
    start:  n47 n44 d02        35.16    31500.00                    0.00 
    start:  n49 n13 d01        11.11    31500.00                    0.00 
    finish: n14 n46            22.91    31500.00    63000.00        0.00 
    finish: n31 n61             0.00   126000.00   252000.00   126000.00* 
    finish: n49 n13             0.00    31500.00    63000.00        0.00 
                                                                           675000.00 
q22 
    start:  n18 n48 d01        33.38    31500.00                    0.00 
    finish: n18 n48             0.00    31500.00    63000.00        0.00 
    finish: n41 n17            44.02    31500.00    63000.00        0.00 
    finish: n45 n42            32.32    31500.00    63000.00        0.00 
    finish: n47 n44            35.16    31500.00    63000.00        0.00 
                                                                           675000.00 
q28 
    start:  n53 n58 d02       135.56        0.00                    0.00* 
                                                                           675000.00 
q29 
    start:  n41 n02 d01        59.32    31500.00                    0.00 
    finish: n41 n02             0.00    31500.00    63000.00        0.00 
    finish: n53 n58           135.56        0.00    22500.00        0.00* 
                                                                           675000.00 
q30 
    start:  n04 n40 d03       297.24        0.00                    0.00* 
    start:  n10 n19 d01         9.96    11250.00                11250.00* 
    finish: n10 n19             0.00    11250.00    22500.00    11250.00* 
                                                                           697500.00 
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q31 
    build:  n04 n40           297.24        0.00                    0.00* 
                                                                           697500.00 
q32 
    start:  n06 n03 d02       252.54        0.00                    0.00* 
    finish: n04 n40           297.24        0.00    63000.00        0.00* 
                                                                           697500.00 
q33 
    finish: n06 n03           252.54        0.00    63000.00        0.00* 
                                                                           697500.00 
q34 
    start:  n47 n13 d01        54.99    31500.00                    0.00 
    finish: n47 n13             0.00    31500.00    63000.00        0.00 
                                                                           697500.00 
q37 
    start:  n07 n05 d01         6.54     2250.00                    0.00 
    start:  n08 n05 d01         7.34    11250.00                11250.00* 
    finish: n07 n05             0.00     2250.00     4500.00        0.00 
    finish: n08 n05             0.00    11250.00    22500.00    11250.00* 
                                                                           697500.00 
q39 
    start:  n18 n40 d01       105.64    31500.00                    0.00 
    start:  n20 n03 d01        49.68    11250.00                    0.00 
    start:  n43 n44 d01        77.56    31500.00                    0.00 
    finish: n18 n40             0.00    31500.00    63000.00        0.00 
    finish: n20 n03             0.00    11250.00    22500.00        0.00 
    finish: n43 n44             0.00    31500.00    63000.00        0.00 
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APPENDIX N.  BIRD’S EYE OF “BASELINE ATTACKS” 
This diagram provides a condensed view of the Baseline Iraqi oil distribution 
network over the 40-quarter planning horizon.  Junctions are represented by circles and 
the pipelines by solid lines.  Each junction is identified by its common name and the 
applicable GAMS ID’s.  Junctions annotated with an “S” indicate they are sources of 
crude oil, and junctions with a “T” indicate the terminals.  Al Basra and Khor Al-Amaya 
terminals are also surrounded by a box to indicate that they are offshore oil facilities and 
subject to insurgent attacks.  Each pipeline has a set of four numbers inside parentheses.  
These values indicate the following:   
 
(X, - , - , - ) ‘0’ indicates the pipeline is pre-existing.  ‘1’ indicates the pipeline 
is new construction. 
( - ,X, - , - ) Indicates the quarter in which the pipeline is either upgraded or 
new construction begins.  A value of ‘-’ indicates no capital 
expansion project is initiated during the planning horizon. 
( - , - ,X, - ) Indicates the number of quarters this particular pipeline is 
defended during the planning horizon. 
( - , - , - ,X) Indicates the number of times the pipeline is attacked.  This value 
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n54-nt Turkish Border Crossing            5,060,250       n59-nt Iran Crossing                      810,000       
n55-nt Kuwait Crossing                    -                  n60-nt Al Basra (Al Bakra) terminal       3,402,000    
n56-nt Saudi Arabia Border                4,257,000       n61-nt Khor al-Amaya terminal             7,065,000    
n57-nt Syria Crossing                     425,250          n62-nt Shuaiba (Umm Qasar Terminal)     2,439,000    
n58-nt Jordan Border Crossing             398,250          
Grand Total 23,856,750  
Common Name
Total Flow   
(kbbl)Common Name
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